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Chapter 20
A TALE OF TWO OWNERS:
REAL PROPERTY GO-OWNERSHIP AND
MINERAL DEVELOPMENT
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$ 20.01 Introduction

[I] The Concept of Owning Together
Blackstone has defined the hallmark of private property as
the ability to exclude others from use of property, subject
only to the rules of law governing society.' When parties
"own property together," the right to exclude is modified: the
co-owners cannot exclude each other, but they may protect
the property and exclude non-members of the "owning"
community, primarily through trespass laws. Although the
form of "owning together" may vary, concurrent ownership is
an all-inclusive term. Once there are two concurrent owners,
a tale of two owners may begin.2

2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *2 and *134.
General treatments of concurrent ownership and mineral development include
the following, in alphabetical order: Owen L. Anderson & Michael D. Cuda, 'The
Nonconsenting Cotenant in Oil and Gas Development: The Oil Patch Version of the
'Little Red Hen'," 12 Eastern Min. L. Znst. 16-1(1991);Frank Erisman & Elizabeth
Jennings Dalton, 'Multi-Party Ownership of Minerals-Some Real Property
Consequences of Joint Mineral Development," 25 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Znst. 7-1(1979);
Richard W. Hemingway, The Law of Oil and Gas (3d ed. 1991); Will A. Knight,
'Cotenancy-A Sometimes Unhbly Alliance," 33rd Oil & Gas Znst. 225 (Sw. L. Fdn.
1982); 1 Eugene Kuntz, Law of Oil and Gas $3 5.1 - 5.12 (1987);Eugene Kuntz,
'Gas Balancing Rights and Remedies in the Absence of a Balancing Agreement," 35
Rocky Mt. Min. L. Znst. 13-1 (1989); Patrick H. Martin, 'The Gas Balancing
Agreement: What, When, Why, and How," 36 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Znst. 13-1(1990);
Cheryl Outerbridge, 'Missing and Unknown Mineral Owners," 25 Rocky Mt. Min.
15. Inst. 20-1(1979);Homer J. Penn, 'Cotenancy Problems: Is the Gas Balancing

Concurrent ownership originates in several ways. A common
genesis is through marriage: a husband and wife seek to have
their lives arranged as "one." A similarly common, albeit less
celebratory reason for concurrent ownership, arises from death.
Either through intestacy or through devise, heirs or children
are oRen left property to "share and share alike." A final
common rationale for concurrent ownership is more peculiar to
the mineral industry. The presence or absence of minerals is
oRen speculative. To spread risks and increase revenue
possibilities, investors may buy partial mineral interests in
several tracts. Shares of minerals can also compensate geologists or other collaborator^.^
To fully understand the concurrent ownership problems that
may confront the oil and gas developer, three major types of
concurrent ownership must be a d d r e ~ s e d .In
~ the mineral
investment realm, most concurrent ownership is as tenants in
common. This mode of ownership therefore will receive
primary attention. In distinguishing cotenancy from the other
major forms of ownership, four attributes should be compared:
(1) the right to alienate inter vivos by giR or sale, (2) the right
to devise by will operable at death, (3) the right to pass the
property a t death through the relevant jurisdiction's intestacy
statutes, and (4)the ability to end the relationship and own
the property individually. The cotenant has all four rights. The
remaining two of the big three forms of concurrent ownership

Agreement the Answer?" 33 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 18-1 (1987);James L. Shepherd,
Jr., "Problems Incident to Joint Ownership of the Oil and Gas Leasehold Estate,"
5th Oil & Gas Inst. 215 (Sw. L. Fdn. 1954);Ernest E. Smith, "Gas Marketing by CoOwners: Disproportionate Sales, Gas Imbalances and Lessors' Claims to Royalties,"
39 Baylor L. Rev. 366 (1987);W.L. Summers, Oil and Gas (2d ed. 1954); and 2
Howard R. Williams & Charles J. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law $4 502-10 (Martin &
Kramer ed., 1996).
30wners may also seek to cash in on a boom by granting multiple interests. See
Outerbridge, supra note 2, at 20-3 to 20-5.
4 ~ o m m u n i t yproperty, tenancy in coparcenary, and tenancy in partnership are
not discussed. For concurrent ownership generally, see, 4 Thompson on Real
Property, Thomas Edition 1-189 and 313-46 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994);John E.
Cribbet & Corwin W . Johnson, Principles of the Law of Property 86-107 (3d ed.
1989); and Roger A. Cunningham, William B. Stoebuck & Dale A. Whitman, The
Law of Property 187-246 (2d ed. 1993).
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that often impact title opinions are joint tenancy and tenancy
by the entirety. These have only some of the incidents of a
cotenancy. Both joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety
provide for a right of survivorship, which eliminates both the
second and third attributes of a cotenancy. One fundamental
difference between these two forms, however, is that a tenancy
by the entirety may only be held by a husband and wife but
anyone may be a joint tenant with anyone chosen.
[21 Inherent Problems with Concurrent Ownership

Because no two people view the world identically, concurrent
owners may not agree on property development. As a judge
astutely noted, "Two . . . cannot plow the same furrow."5 Each
owner could rush to reach his or her favored outcome. This
leads to the phenomenon referred to as the "Tragedy of the
Commons.'* Externalities may increase as each concurrent
owner attempts to maximize his or her self-interest without
considering the ultimate impact on the property's value.
Moreover, if anyone desired to purchase or otherwise develop
the concurrently owned property, transaction costs increase if
all co-owners must concur.
To clarify these principles, consider the consequences of a
bequest by an Uncle Jed of a fishing cabin to his two favorite
relatives, the siblings Avery and Lou, as tenants in common.
It was the best of times; it was the worst of times. The loss of
Uncle Jed was sad, but the thought of the cabin was pleasing.
Nevertheless, some discontent would creep in over use of the
cabin. And then, to unashamedly intermix cultural icons, the
discord would increase as "up through the ground came some
bubbling crude, oil that is, black gold."'

' ~ a s t b a u m v. Mastbaum, 9 A.2d 51, 55 (N.J. 1939).
b a r r e t t Hardin, 'The Tragedy of the Commons," 162 Science 1243 (1968) (when
pasturage is owned in common, no individual herder has incentive to limit cattle
grazed because others would consume forage if herder did not; decreased productivity may result).
7 " ~ h eBallad of Jed Clampett."
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20.02 Tenants-in-Common and Non-Mineral

Development
[I] Basic Ownership Rights
Under current law, a deed or gift to one or more parties
without additional verbiage is presumed to be a tenancy in
common. Avery and Lou, as tenants in common, each have an
"undivided" right to the whole. There is no line down the
center of the fishing cabin a s might be placed in the center of
a room two squabbling children share. For a tenancy in
common to exist, only one unity is required. The cotenants
must have a unity of possession; they do not have to have the
same shares in the property or have received their rights from
the same source. It is essentially a relationship between
A tenancy in common has been defined as a joint interest in
which there is unity of possession, but separate and distinct
titles. The relationship exists where property is held by
several distinct titles by unity of possession, and is not an
estate but a relation between persons, the only essential
being a possessory right, as to which all are entitled to
equal use and possession.8
The cotenants, however, can treat their interests in the
property as separate interests. Each tenant in common may
sell his or her interest or even subdivide it. At the death of
either sibling, if not earlier sold, the cotenant's interest passes
to a devisee by will or to the dead sibling's heir by intestacy.
Nevertheless, both Avery and Lou during their co-ownership
must let the other have possession of the cabin. Neither one
can "oust" the other. Ouster is a denial of the right to share the
property. Ouster, however, is difficult to define. Changing locks
may not be sufficient to create an ouster if Avery answered the
door bell and let Lou in. Physical removal definitely would be
an ouster.' Cotenants also must not commit waste of the

%e Mik v. Cargill, 485 P.2d 229, 232 (Okla. 1971). See also Thompson, supra
note 4, 8 32.06(a).
9

For potential ousters in the oil and gas arena, see Anderson & Cuda, supra note
2, at 16-13 and 16-14 (need notorious, open actions that are communicated to the
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property. In other words, one cotenant cannot unreasonably
interfere with the other's expectations and injure the property.
Removal of items from the land could be waste but the
cotenant so removing, despite liability for waste, may gain title
to the trees or other crops removed.1° In order to end the
relationship of cotenancy, however, partition is available.
Partition would separate the property either physically (so
ownership of separate tracts will be in severalty) or partition
may ensue by selling the property and dividing the proceeds.
121 When Cotenant Can Recover for Expenditures
Made to Benefit Estate
Not all cotenants will take equal interest in the concurrent
estate. Presume, however, that neither Avery nor Lou are in
exclusive possession of the fishing cabin. Avery, nevertheless,
is a tinkerer and compulsive bill payer. If Avery wants to make
Lou bear a proportionate share of expenses, the reckoning
between the managing cotenant and the passive one can arise
a t three points of time. The first is during the pendency of the
cotenancy when Avery might want an immediate contribution
from Lou. The second possibility arises during a court proceeding for an accounting of rents and profits. The final time frame
would be when partition is sought to end the estate. The last
two scenarios assume that there may be some proceeds to be
divvied up.
[a] Property Leased by One Cotenant
To continue our tale of two owners, without objection from
Lou, Avery rents the fishing cabin for the season for $2400."
other cotenant).

he

Statute of Westminister I1 in 1285 first authorized an action by a cotenant
alleging waste or seeking partition. (13 Edw. I, 1 Statutes at Large 196). If a
defendant was guilty of waste, the defendant could either accept a partition of the
land or refrain from depleting the land except to the extent other cotenants
depleted. In essence, the relief was "partition in kind or balancing in kind, at the
election of the defendant." Kuntz, supra note 2, Q 13.03[11 (calling remedy
incomplete).
''statute of Anne of 1705 (4 Anne, C. 16 VII, 11Statutes a t Large 161) allowed
for accounting for the profits of renting co-owned property if one party received
more than a just share or proportion. It, like the Statute of Westminister, was
incorporated into the common law of the various states.

Avery had paid the following: $500 for taxes; $1000 on interest
on the cabin's mortgage; $100 principal on the cabin's mortgage; $50 to unclog a drain; and $75 to install a shower stall.
In all, Avery spent $1725. Avery might or might not seek
recompense from Lou.
Avery's first possibility is an independent action for contribution against Lou for half of the costs.12 To evaluate the remedy's availability, each item must be considered separately. If
the repair of the drain was necessary, some courts would allow
such an action if Avery gave notice to Lou of the need, although other courts seem to demand an agreement between
the parties before allowing independent contribution for
repairs. The shower stall presents a different question; if it is
considered an improvement no contribution will lie.13 As for
the taxes and mortgage payments, some courts will allow an
independent action if both were liable for the payments. The
theory for recovery is subrogation; Avery would have paid the
debts of Lou and might be able to enforce Lou's duties by a
new lien on the property.14 Avery, however, might not worry
a t this point because Avery has the $2400 rent proceeds.
Naturally, Avery's enriched bank balance might arouse Lou's
interest. Lou could seek an accounting to go aRer half the
proceeds, namely $1200.'~Avery will seek credit for half of
the expenditures: $250 taxes, $550 mortgage payments, and a t
least the $25 drain repair. Lou would get the proceeds less
these expenses. As for the shower stall, Avery would get credit
if the stall was an improvement that increased the value of the
fishing cabin.

12see generally 4 Thompson, supra note 4, § 32.07(b).
13An exception from the rule of no contribution for improvements is if the
improvement is necessary to prevent waste. A new roof might be such a n example.
Shaw & Estes v. Texas Consolidated Oils, 299 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App. 1957 writ
refused n.r.e.).

'*some jurisdictions have modified the tax responsibilities of co-owners. Hence,
additional payments would be voluntary and not subject to reimbursement. See
Smith v. Anderson, 57 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1967) (principle that tax payment inures to
benefit of all cotenants inapplicable if interests separately taxed).
'see

generally 4 Thompson, supra note 4, 8 32.07(c).

$1000 on interest
the cabin's mort311 a shower stall.
r might not seek
:tion for contribuvaluate the remered separately. If
)urts would allow
of the need, al.cement between
contribution for
question; if it is
will lie.13 As for
rts will allow an
? payments. The
Id have paid the
ou's duties by a
night not worry
lt proceeds.
;ht arouse Lou's
after half the
-edit for half of
iyments, and at
e proceeds less
vould get credit
the value of the
a

ovements is if the

co-ownem. Hence,
!imbursement. See
payment inures to
1).

'

Some variants on the hypothetical can further clarify the
relationship of the parties. What if the mortgage interest was
$2000? Lou would then be liable for a n extra $500. A suit for
accounting would not be advisable by Lou; Lou would owe
$125 if Avery sought contribution through a counter claim.
In this situation, however, Avery might want to seek a n
accounting to clarify obligations and get the extra $125 owed
by Lou on the books for later reckoning even if Avery could
not get the money by a n independent contribution action.
As another variant, suppose that Avery transforms the
fishing cabin into a more winter-proof dwelling and rents it
to skiers for $300 a week. The total take one season was
$1200. Avew would not have to account to Lou for these
proceeds. NO; could Avery directly get the improvement costs
from Lou.16
[b] Property Exclusively Used by One Cotenant
To change the hypothetical, presume Avery made the
original $1725 worth of expenditures and used the fishing
cabin each weekend. Lou is in Maine and has no desire to
use the cabin but, in fact, seeks partition. The effect of Avery
having exclusive possession varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Under the majority approach," Avery would
have no right to any credit for excess expenditures in a n
accounting because Avery's exclusive possession would be
presumed to offset the increased expenses; the expenses
would be equivalent to the rental value of the cabin. Under
a second approach, the cotenant out of possession may prove
the value of exclusive possession and, in theory, may be owed

'%he concept behind not allowing contribution for improvements is that no one
should be forced out of their estate by another voluntarily incurring unneeded costs.
17
Mastbaum v. Mastbaum, 9 A.2d 51 (N.J. 1939); Barrow v. Barrow, 527 So. 2d
1373 (Fla. 1988). This approach encourages property use; improvements would be
made and normally the using cotenant will not owe rent. But even under it, a t some
point the non-possessing cotenant may have a right to 112 of the cabin's reasonable
rental value if that cotenant could prove ouster. Flexible, individual attention to
when an ouster transpired allows the expectation of the parties to enter the
equation. For example, if children inherit a house, what they might expect if one
sibling remains in the house may turn on the type of property, the wealth of each
sibling, and the siblings' conduct before and after the death of their parents.

9 20.02[3]
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rent if half the expenses were less than 112 the rental
value.'' A second minority approach would enable Avery to
be recompensed for the excess payments because Lou was
not formally ousted; Lou retained the right to possession.'g
According to these jurisdictions, the Statute of Anne only
requires accounting for third party rents and Avery's actions
benefitted all concurrent owners.
[31 How to End the Tenancy-in-Common
Partition would separate the property either physically (so
ownership will be in severalty) or partition may take place by
selling the property and dividing the proceeds. As the Kansas
court put it in Muslow v. Gerber Energy Gorp.? partition is
"much favored in law because it secures peace, promotes
industry and enterprise and avoids compelling an unwilling
person to use their property in common."21Partition in kind
is the theoretical first choice so each party could retain
realty.22 If separation cannot be accomplished evenly, one
cotenant may make a cash payment known as ~ w e l t y . ' ~
Additionally, if separating the property would lower its overall
value, courts may order partition by sale, also referred to as
licitation.
Often, an accounting accompanies the partition action. The
majority rule treats improvements made by one cotenant as
being credited totally to the improving cotenant with one
caveat: the so-called improvements must have actually
improved the value of the property.24 Giving the improving
cotenant the total increase in value may credit that cotenant

18

Cohen v. Cohen, 106 N.E.2d 77 (Ohio 1952). This may lead to less incentive to
seek partition and end potential problems.
I g ~ a i r dv. Moore, 141 A.2d 324 (N.J. 1958).
20697 P.2d 1269 (Kan. 1985).
2 1 ~ dat
. 1273.

2 2 ~ e generally
e
4 Thompson, supra note 4, 5 38.04.
23
Cain v. Christie, 937 P.2d 119 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
24
See generally Cunningham et a l . , supra note 4 , 5 5.12.
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with more than the tenant's expenditures. If the so-called
improvements did not increase the value of the property,
however, the expending cotenant bears their full cost. The
rationale for giving all the increase in value to the active
cotenant reflects the fact that often there is no incentive to
improve common property. The rule therefore encourages risk.
Assigning the active tenant any loss, however, helps to prevent
improvident modifications to the property.
Repairs, however, are generally treated differently in an
accounting. The expending cotenant is a t least always given a
credit. Repairs are deemed somehow necessary; they could
preserve the estate and prevent waste. Sometimes, however, it
is difficult to draw the line between repairs and improvements.==
[41 Extent of Fiduciary Duties Between Co-Owners
Cotenants, especially when they receive interests by the same
deed or transaction, such as a will, are often viewed as
fiduciaries. These types of concurrent owners owe a high
degree of care for interests of others. This makes sense in the
situation of a will, which normally deals with fa mi lie^.'^ It is
less material in the investment situati~n.~'
§ 20.03 Joint Tenancy Contrasted with Tenancy-inCommon and Tenancy by Entirety
Both of the remaining types of concurrent ownership differ
from tenancy in common in one respect: the concurrent owners
who hold by joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety have
rights of survivorship. In other respects, the joint tenancy acts
like a tenancy in common hypothetical; a tenancy by the
entireties, however, has different rules about management of
the co-owned property. Although later sections of this article
pay primary attention to mineral development, relevant
peculiarities of these two forms of concurrent ownership will be
addressed directly as they are explained.

"see

supra note 13 for the problems of classifying a new roof.

'%ee

Cunningham et al., supra note 4, a t 217-22.

27
See

4 20.11,infm.

[ 11 Joint Tenancy

[a] Creation
For joint tenancy, it would be preferable to make the tale one
of three owners. A typical conveyance that would create a joint
tenancy would grant to "A, B, and C as joint tenants." Often a
scrivener will add "with rights of s ~ n i v o r s h i p . At
" ~ ~common
law, conveyances to "A, B, and C jointly" or simply to "A, B,
and C" were presumed to create a joint tenancy; tenancy in
common, however, is the preferred construction of an ambiguous grant today, but some common law traditions still do
govern for joint tenancies. Most importantly, four unities mark
a joint tenancy.29
At common law, to be joint tenants required four unities to be
present. The first is the same unity required for a tenancy at
common: the concurrent owners must have unity of possession.
Each must have the right to possess the whole. The second
unity is that of time. The joint tenants must have received
their interest a t the same time. The third unity is the unity of
title: rights must be derived from the same source, be it a deed,
will or by adverse possession together. The fourth unity is
referred to as unity of interest. It is presumed that the joint
tenants have equal undivided shares and their rights must be
of equal duration, that is, either a leasehold, fee, or life estate.
Therefore, an initial grant from 0 to A, B, and C as joint
tenants would be interpreted as A, B, C each owning an 113
undivided interest in fee as joint tenants. To illustrate how
survivorship works, if no inter vivos conveyances are made by
A, B, or C, when A dies then B and C would each own an 112
undivided interest in fee as joint tenants. On the death of B, C
would own all the property in fee simple.
[bl Concept of Severance of Joint Tenancy
Because of the importance of the four unities to a joint
tenancy, a joint tenancy is a fragile vehicle. A joint tenancy

28

In some jurisdictions, such as Texas, the parties must clearly contract for
survivorship. Tex. Probate Code Ann. !j 46 (1987).Seegenerally Cribbet & Johnson,
supra note 4,at 106-08and Cunningham et a!., supra note 4, at 196-98.

?ice generally 4 Thompson, supra note 4, !j 31.06.

ake the tale one
~ l create
d
a joint
mants." Often a
. n28 At common
;imply to "A, B,
ncy; tenancy in
n of a n ambiguditions still do
ur unities mark
lur unities to be
3r a tenancy a t
y of possession.
tle. The second
have received
is the unity of
:e, be it a deed,
ourth unity is
that the joint
rights must be
, or life estate.
nd C as joint
~ w n i n ga n l/3
illustrate how
s are made by
ch own an l/2
! death of B, C

es to a joint
joint tenancy

!arly contract for
ribbet & Johnson,
196-98.

may be "severed by the action of one of the joint tenants that
interferes with the four unities3' To illustrate, return to A, B,
and C, who are all living joint tenants. Next, presume that A
conveys A's interest to D. After the conveyance, title will not
remain the same with D substituted. D cannot be a joint
tenant with B and C because the unities of time and title are
not present.
There could be two possible ways to appraise title a t this
point. One alternative would be that A, B, and D each have l/3
undivided interests as tenants in common. An argument
against this is that B and C still have all the unities that were
required to create the joint tenancy. It was only A who
interfered by the conveyance to D. This analysis leads to the
correct response. Title to this land is now "blended": B and C
hold 213 as joint tenants and D owns a n undivided l/3 as a
tenant in common. If B then dies intestate under a statute
dictating that all of B's property was to go to H, H would not
get B's interest in the property. B was a joint tenant and C's
rights of survivorship would take effect. C and D would then
be tenants in common, with C having an undivided 213 interest
and D an undivided l/3 interest. To slightly vary the problem,
presume B had died and left a will expressly giving the subject
land to H. The result, nevertheless, would not change. Despite
the fact that the will showed B had an intent to sever the joint
tenancy, a will operates as of death and, a t the instant of
death, C got B's share. An inter vivos transfer is needed to
create a severance.
One inter vivos transfer that raises questions is whether or
not an oil and gas lease executed by one joint tenant should
sever the joint tenancy.31 Obviously, if it does not sever the
joint tenancy and the leasing joint tenant dies, the oil company
would have no rights. The preferred view of commentators is
to consider the lease as severing only the oil and gas estate for
the life of the lease. The surviving joint tenant would have l/2
of the oil and gas unburdened by the oil and gas lease and the

3 0 ~ e generally
e
Cunningham et al., supra note 4, 4 5.4.
31

See 1 Kuntz, supra note 2, 4 5.9 and Majorie P. Mosburg, "Effect of Mineral
Lease On Joint Tenancy," 12 Okla. L. Rev. 302 (1959).

existing lease would burden the remaining half. At the end of
the leasehold, the surviving joint tenant would own all the
minerals and land. One reason commending this solution is the
nature of property most oRen held in joint tenancy: farms,
ranches, homes, and investment housing. Laymen favor joint
tenancy for these types of properties because of the automatic
nature of the estate. The property goes to the other joint
tenant a t death if neither did anything. This avoids probate
delays, and creditors of the dead person.32 An oil and gas
lease totally severing the joint tenancy would interfere with
this fundamental estate planning.
[c] Partition of Joint Tenancy
Most statutes directly allow for partition of joint tenancies.
Even if they do not allow the same directly, because the joint
tenancy can be severed and a tenancy in common created,
partition is available to all joint tenants, albeit circuitously.33
Despite the fact that one of the four unities of a joint tenancy
is unity of interest, on partition one joint tenant could prove
that the shares were not equal based on contributions to the
purchase price or other intention^.^^
[21 Tenancy by the Entirety
There are differences between joint tenancy and tenancy by
entirety despite both having rights of survivorship and
requiring the four unities for creation. A joint tenancy may be
severed and generally may be partitioned. Anyone may decide
to be a joint tenant with anyone, but a tenancy by entirety
requires a husband and wife. Therefore, the estate needs a
fifth unity, that of marriage. Moreover, with a tenancy by the
entireties, a conveyancecannot sever the relationship. Furthermore, neither owner can seek partition. Divorce or conveyance
from one spouse to the other are the only ways to modify the

3

%he technique will not avoid estate taxes because property passes because of
death. The Internal Revenue Service computes the share that goes to the survivor
based on contributions to its purchase; it does not necessarily presume equal shares.
Cribbet & Johnson, supra note 4, at 110.
%ee generally 4 Thompson, supra note 4,

8 38.03(a).

= ~ e z ov. Jezo, 127 N.W.2d 246, 250, reh'g denied, 129 N.W.2d 195 (Wis. 1964).
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estate. Currently, only twenty-five states at most recognize the
estate a t
There are four models or theories of how a tenancy by the
entireties can be managed. All four recognize that neither the
husband nor the wife can defeat the survivorship rights of the
other.36 The first model, however, would follow the old common law and views the husband as the sole manager of the
property. He can convey the property and his creditors can
attach his interest, subject to the wife's survivorship rights. A
second model converts the estate to something resembling a
tenancy in common with survivorship rights; creditors of either
spouse may attach their individual debtor's interest. The third
way of looking a t the estate is that a conveyance by one spouse
alone is wholly void and a creditor of one spouse cannot reach
even that party's interest. The final view is that a creditor of
an individual spouse could attach its debtor's contingent right
of survivorship.
Little caselaw exists on tenancies by the entireties and oil
and gas. It is presumed states would follow the model they
adopt in other settings.37Regardless of the theory of management adopted, however, neither spouse can defeat the right of
survivorship. Therefore, even if a t common law the husband
andlor wife individually could lease, such an oil and gas lease
would be risky if the leasing spouse dies first. One reported
case required both spouses to lease.38Another case, Tyler v.
B o u ~ h e r :explains
~
the estate in some detail. The court found

354 Thompson, supra note 4, at 112 11.85. Included in these are Alaska, Arkansas,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Wyoming. Other commentators list fewer states. See
Cunningham et al., supra note 4, a t 203 n.3.
36

Seegenerally Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, 297 P.2d 213 (Wyo. 1956); Sawado
v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977).
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3 7 ~ e e1Kuntz, supra note 2,$5.10; and 2 Williams & Meyers, supra note 2, $502
a t 576.3 (assumes lack of litigation reflects few disagreements between spouses and
little productive land is held this way).
3 8 ~ a d u v.
s Hunter, 228 N.W. 782 (Mich. 1930). rev'd on othergrounds, 256 N.W.
323 (Mich. 1934).

d 195 (Wis. 1964).

39285 S.W.2d 524 (Ark. 1956). See also Hercules v. Jones, 609 A.2d 837 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992) (if parties owned 112 interest in a joint tenancy as tenants by the

the husband's sole conveyance gave the husband's rights to the
grantee. When the husband and wife subsequently conveyed a
L/2 interest jointly, the grantee received all rights during the
life of the spouses. Furthermore, because of the husband's
individual conveyance, the grantee's interest would be indefeasible if the wife died first. However, if the husband died first,
the wife would get survivorship rights and the grantee and
wife would be equal tenants in common.
§ 20.04 Who Can Authorize Use of Oil and Gas
The following discussion applies to concurrent ownership in
the form of joint tenancy and tenancy in common.40A reference to "co-owner" will include either type of owner. As noted
above, co-owners have the undivided right to possess the entire
estate. Minerals provide a different problem than a fishing
cabin; to accommodate more cotenants in the cabin simply
requires extra beds. Minerals, however, are "used" in two ways.
The first is by actual development. This would consume part
of the estate and therefore could theoretically be waste. The
second way to use a mineral estate is through geophysical
exploration. Geophysical exploration can determine the
boundaries of the estate's value.41 Two theories have evolved
to reconcile the relationships between co-owners.
To continue our tale, different oil companies that believe
there is some potential in the area now contact Avery and Lou.
Avery, as we may expect, is more enthusiastic than Lou. What
rights the co-owners will have to develop or prevent oil and gas
development are different than those employed to reconcile
using or renting the fishing cabin itself.42

entireties, the survivorship mechanisms of both tenancies applied and the survivor
of the marriage became the joint tenant with the other party).
%hether or not leasing by one joint tenant severs the estate is immaterial to
the discussion of whether the leasing or development could take place. The rules for
tenancy by entirety were briefly discussed in 9 20.03[2], supra. For a review of
community property rules and other implications of marital rights, see Steven J.
Hull, "Spousal Joinder Requirements in the Rocky Mountain States," 29 Rocky Mt.
Min.L. Znst. 545 (1983).
4'~hillipsPetroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957).
4 2 ~ o rtreatments of the problems for minerals other than oil and gas, see
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[I1 Minority Rule: No Co-owner Can Individually
Develop Minerals
A unilateral decision to remove part of a jointly owned
estate has concerned various jurisdictions, partly because it
intrudes upon common law notions of waste, which require
co-owners to preserve the co-owned estates.43 An oft-cited
and cogently argued case for the minority position is Law v.
Heck Oil C O . It
~ ~notes that a mineral interest is real
property, but the produced minerals are personalty. To the
West Virginia court, each owner has the right to keep real
property as real property and an injunction is proper if all do
not concur in d e v e l ~ ~ m e n t The
. " ~ court did acknowledge
that one co-owner might need to act in the face of potential
drainage or else literal waste or loss of the estate would
ensue.46
The result of the Law case, however, was that the holder of
a very small interest could block development by "holdingout'' for a n exorbitant sum. In the particular case, the owner
of an undivided 11768 interest in the oil and gas under the

Erisman & Dalton, supra note 2, and Bruce E. Cryder & Lynn F. Hendon,
"Concurrent and Successive Ownership of Coal Property," 11Eastern Min. L. Inst.
10-1 (1990).
Q ~ u r r a yv. Haverty, 70 111.318 (1873) (interpreting mineral development by one
cotenant as violating statute authorizing actions against a cotenant who "shall take
away, destroy, lessen in value or otherwise injure the common propertyn). Loosely
defined, waste is any action that will diminish the value and enjoyment of the
property.
?45
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S.E. 601 (W. Va. 1928).

4 5 ~ h eother major proponents of the rule are Illinois, Louisiana, and Michigan.
Zeigler v. Brenneman, 86 N.E. 597 (111. 1908); Campbell v. Homer Ore Co., 16
N.W.2d 125 (Mich. 1944); GMB Gas Corp. v. Cox, 340 So. 2d 638 (La. Ct. App.
1976). Louisiana's adoption of the rule is not founded on waste, but on the theory
that co-owners are owners of the whole and must agree. As between the owner of
the estate subject to the servitude and the servitude co-owners, however, production
by one (although unauthorized by the other) interrupts prescription. Coxv. Sanders,
421 So. 2d 869 (La. 1982). Viiginia may have adopted the rule in a recent
controversial case. Chosar Corp. v. Owens, 370 S.E.2d 305 (Va. 1988).

4 6 ~ a w145
, S.E. a t 601. See also Paxton v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., 94 S.E. 472
(W. Va. 1917) (non-leasing cotenant may permit lessee to continue operations and
require lessee to account for the co-tenant's proportionate share of royalty).

131 acre tract demanded $1000. Methods to break the logjam
that can arise in such jurisdictions include seeking partition,
attempting to use compulsory pooling statutes, or resorting
to specific statutory provisions that enable development to go
forward on the desire of specified amounts of undivided
interest^.^' Absent the availability of any statute to assist
Avery, Lou could block actual oil development unless
drainage was imminent. Other jurisdictions provide for
accounting remedies for co-owners such as Lou if Avery
develops the p r ~ p e r t y . ~ '
The oil companies might, however, merely want to do
seismic investigations of Avery and Lou's land. There is less
precedent dealing with whether one co-owner in a minority
jurisdiction could unilaterally authorize geophysical exploration, which is an attribute of a mineral estate.49 Unlike
development, exploration can be performed multiple
times5' Nevertheless, unsuccessful exploration could lower

4 7 ~ egenerally
e
Ernest E . Smith, "Methods for Facilitating the Development of Oil
and Gas Lands Burdened with Outstanding Mineral Interests," 43 Tex. L. Rev. 129
(1964). The followers of the minority rule with statutory provisions include La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. 55 31:174 - 31:177 (1988 & Supp. 1997) (majority rule governs if 80% of
interest owners agree); 765 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 520/0/01-520/10 (West 1993)
(owners of majority may seek court order to authorize drilling for the benefit of all);
and Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 1319.101 (1984) (similar to Illinois). For an examination of compulsory pooling statutes and minority jurisdictions, see Anderson &
Cuda, supra note 2, a t 16-30 to 16-34, and Smith, supra, a t 138-40. For Louisiana
law, see Guy E. Wall, "Joint Oil and Gas Operations in Louisiana," 53 La. L. Rev.
1 (1992).
48~ampbell,16 N.W.2d a t 125. See generally Anderson & Cuda, supra note 2, a t
16-25 to 16-30 and 2 Williams & Meyers, supra note 2, 1 504.2. A Michigan case
also allowed one producing cotenant to obtain the other cotenant's title through
adverse possession without an ouster of the other cotenant. Thomas v. Rex A.
Wilcox Trust, 463 N.W.2d 190 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). Generally, one cotenant cannot
adversely possess against another without ouster because each has the right to use
the property. Michigan considers development by one cotenant waste and thus
adverse.
49
See Smith v. United Fuel Gas Co., 166 S.E. 533 (W. Va. 1932) (cotenant may
enter to explore but production would be waste). Louisiana covers geophysical
operations under its statute, allowing those with 80% interest to proceed. La. Rev.
Stat. 5 175 (1996) (added by amendment in 1995).
5 0 ~ f Mustang
:
Production Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 754 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1985) (do
not presume lessee gets exclusive exploration rights unless lease is specific).
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the speculative value of the property, and potentially injure
the non-consenting co-~wner.~'
[21 Majority Rule: Each Co-owner Can Individually
Develop Minerals
If Avery and Lou's land is in a jurisdiction that follows the
majority rule, each co-owner could develop the minerals
individually. They would not be liable for waste for producing oil or gas.52 The theory behind allowing each co-owner
to develop is that each co-owner has a n undivided right to
possess and use the co-owned property. An eloquent expression of this concept is found in Prairie Oil & Gas Co. u.
Allen:53
Tenants in common are the owners of the substance of the
estate. They may make such reasonable use of the
common property a s is necessary to enjoy the benefit and
value of such ownership. Since a n estate of a cotenant in
a mine or oil well can only be enjoyed by removing the
products thereof, the taking of mineral from a mine and
the extraction of oil from a n oil well are the use and not
the destruction of the estate. This being true, a tenant in
common, without the consent of his cotenant, has the
right to develop and operate the common property for oil
and gas and for that purpose may drill wells and erect
necessary plants. He must not, however, exclude his
cotenant from exercising the same rights and privilege ~ . ~ ~
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Cf.Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 253 P. 862 (Wyo. 1927) (loss of speculative value not
compensable from trespass) and Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190
(Tex. Com. App. 1925) (loss of speculative value is compensable damage from
trespass).
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'%his does not mean that one cotenant could not be liable for "waste" for actions
other than simple production. Waste is hard to define, but it includes permanent
damage to the property from an abandoned well used for salt water disposal.
Cooperative Refinery Association v. Young, 393 P.2d 537 (Okla. 1964) (operating
cotenant liable to other cotenants).

1
;
.* 1
,%.

532 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924) (applying Oklahoma law).
5 4 ~ da. t 571. As expressed by Martin, supra note 2, a t 13-9:

In addition to recognizing development as a co-owner's
appropriate possession, the majority rule recognizes that for
hydrocarbons, their fugitive character could mean that if coowners must wait for all to concur, minerals could be
drained.55 An important corollary of the rule that each coowner has the right to develop and sell the oil is that the
purchaser from the developing cotenant does not convert oil
owned by another co-owner.56 The rule is followed in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Kansas,
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, and Texas5'
There are two constraints on the developing cotenant. First,
the cotenant cannot exclude the other co-owner from also
developing.58 Second, the developing co-owner must account

The "true cotenancy" approach postulates a n ownership right in every molecule
of gas, and any sale of the gas stream inures to the benefit or detriment of
every party with a n ownership interest. Failure to account for the value
realized by a selling party would be keeping money that belongs to others.
Such an approach must reject the idea that any party has a right to take a
share in kind because everyone shares a n ownership right in each and every
molecule.
Although his definition is correct, industry custom did develop so as to allow
cotenants to balance in kind if desired.
55

Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), affd, 195 S.W.
1139 (Tex. 1917). A cotenant, however, does not have a n affirmative duty to drill
and protect another cotenant from drainage. Zimmerman v. Texaco, Inc., 409
S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966 error refd, n.r.e.) (involved unleased owner of 1/12
interest suing lessee of remaining 11/12 interest; unleased owner could drill if
desired).
S$ullard v. Broadwell, 588 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. App. 1979) (developing coowner must account).
" ~ e r h a r d v. Stephens, 442 P.2d 692 (Cal. 1968); Marias River Syndicate v. Big
West Well Co., 38 P.2d 599 (Mont. 1934). For additional cases, see 2 Summers,
supra note 2, § 472; 1Kuntz, supra note 2, 5 5.3; and Fife v. Thompson, 708 S.W.2d
611 (Ark. 1986).
58

Superior Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 242 P.2d 454, 456 (Okla. 1952)
(drilling only well allowable under relevant spacing rules not an ouster). Because
each co-tenant has the right to develop t h e minerals, i t is difficult for one cotenant
to clear title by adverse possession. A clear, communicated ouster is needed. Patrick
J. Carver & Patricia J. Winmill, "Medicine for Ailing Mineral Titles: An Assessment
of the Impact of Adverse Possession, Statutes of Limitation, and Dormant Mineral
Acts," 29 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 267, 276-77 (1983).
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to the other co-owners and bears the financial risk. The nonconsenting co-owner is "carried" for the test well and need
not pay for a dry hole out of pocket.59
Absent a mining partnership, the non-developing co-owner
is not personally liable for costs. For example, in Sparks
Brothers Drilling Co. v. Texas Moran Explor. CO.,~'a 114
interest owner was found only liable to the extent of its
interest in well, which was operating under a standard Joint
Operating Agreement (JOA) that denied the creation of a
partnership. The court found there was no mining partnership, which requires: (1)a joint interest in the property, (2)
a n express or implied agreement to share profits and losses,
and (3) cooperation in the project.61 In Sparks Brothers,
there was a question as to whether the cotenant participated
in management. It is clear, however, that cotenancy alone
does not create a partnership. For a partnership, a community of losses as well as profits is needed.62 If cotenants
develop pursuant to an agreement, they can, of course, have
personal liability for costs and each could lien the other
cotenant's interest.63
[a] Each Co-owner May Lease for Oil a n d Gas
One of the primary attributes of the majority rule is that
each co-owner can lease individually, so Avery could proceed.
The lease from one co-owner will not bind the non-consenting
cotenant, but will be a lease of the consenting co-owners's
share. In other words, the lessee steps into the shoes of the
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59Krug v. h u g , 618 P.2d 323, 325-26 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980); Willson v. Superior
Oil Co., 274 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (driller does so at own risk of a
dry hole).

"ld. a t 953. For mining partnerships in general, see Shepherd, supra note 2, at
234-50 and Erisman & Dalton, supra note 2, a t 7-38 to 7-60.

I

t

F

i

6 2 ~ e r m ev.
r Donaldson, 18 F.2d 697, 699 (3d Cir. 1927) (agreement allowed cotenant when notified to participate in expenses and if co-tenant does not do so, even
if not notified, would only get royalty). See also Krug, 618 P.2d at 325.
6 3 ~ i l lv. Field, 384 F.2d 829, 831 (10th Cir. 1967).

lessor.64The lessee is not a trespasser as to the non-leasing
co-owners but becomes upon entry a tenant in common. As
will be made more vivid later, the Kansas court correctly
recognized that while a lease from one co-owner gives legal
rights, a lease from one co-owner might not be worthwhile
economically because of the need to account; deductibility of
expenses will often be an issue and create hazards for the
developer.65
The difficulty arises out of a basic premise of the majority
rule, namely that one co-owner cannot compel another coowner to sign a lease. The Tenth Circuit underscored this
point when it rejected an innovative remedy the district
court ordered. A co-owner of a term interest claimed that the
other co-owner was trying to freeze out development until
the term ended. The district court remedy was to let first one
party have the option to drill, and then the other. The nonconsenting party would get a proportionate royalty." The
Tenth Circuit in Shell Oil Co. v. S e e l i g ~ o nsaid
~ ~ the remedy would inappropriately convert a mineral interest to a
royalty.68
Another corollary of individual development is that the oil
and gas lease one co-owner executes is valid between its
parties, but does not affect the other ~o-owner.~'
For example, when some co-owners leased and communitized the
concurrently owned land with other land, non-leasing coowners had no right to share in proceeds when the production was not from the land in which they owned minerals. To

64~rairieOil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1924).
65

Brooksv. Mull, 78 P.2d 879 (Kan. 1938). Cf:Gerhard v. Stephens, 442 P.2d 692,
716 (Cal. 1968) (rationale for non-development that countered abandonment claim
was that 148 cotenants existed who could not be located).
"~eeli~sonv. Eilers, 131 F. Supp. 639 (D.Kan. 1955).
67231 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1955).

"ld. a t 18. See also Bemis v. Bemis, 98 P.2d 156 (Kan. 1940) (cannot compel one
cotenant to sign a lease).
69~illsonv. Superior Oil Co., 274 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
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share proceeds, the non-leasing co-owners must ratify and
join the lease and communitization agreement."
The premise that one co-owner cannot tie another to a lease
does make it appear incongruous that a non-leasing co-owner
can ratify a lease. Normally, ratification is possible when
someone could have entered into a contract on another's
behalf, but a technicality prevented the contract from being
valid. A co-owner, however, can ratify the act of one who
could not have previously bound the co-owner's interest.
Signing of division orders could be a ratification." Other
forms of ratification may include signing copies of the lease
and accepting rentals with knowledge of the lease.I2 The
non-developing co-owner thus has a choice. Generally, a
proportionate share of net proceeds would be worth more
than the royalty in a lease proportionately reduced by the
same fraction, but actual circumstances may lead to different
results. If a well is not likely to pay out, joining the lease
and getting an immediate royalty may make more sense
than remaining entitled to a proportionate share of net
proceeds.
[b] Basic Relationship Between Co-Owners When
One Develops
To present a n overview of the relationship between coowners when one is developing and one is not and to continue to imbue some personality to the discussion, the developing co-owner will be Avery, who has leased to an oil company
named Dudley Do Oil, and Lazy Lou will be the unleased coowner. Again, Prairie Oil & Gas Co., in which the nonleasing cotenant held a 1/10 interest, provides the general
contours of the relationship:

se of the majority
'mpel another counderscored this
nedy the district
;claimed that the
evelopment until
ras to let first one
other. The nonte royalty.66 The
i7
said the reme.a1 interest to a
n t is that the oil

did between its
1er.69For examnmunitized the
non-leasing co]en the produced minerals. To

~ h e n s442
, P.2d 692,
abandonment claim
1

[cannot compel one
1954).

70~uperiorOil Co. v. Roberts, 398 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 19661, discussed in Knight,
supra note 2, a t 234-36. See also Donnan v. Atlantic Richfield, 732 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.
App. 1987) (cotenant may execute a lease with a pooling clause and need not inform
other cotenants).
71

Texas & Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Kirtley, 288 S.W. 619,622-23 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926).
72
Gulf Refining Co. v. Travis, 30 So. 2d 398 (Miss. 1947).

Under the general rule . . . [the] Oil Company would be
bound to account to . . . [Lazy Lou] for one-tenth of the
net profits determined by deducting from one-tenth of all
reasonable and legitimate expenses for development and
operating the property for oil and gas, but in the event of
loss it could not compel her to reimburse it for any part of
the loss.73
Costs could be recovered because Dudley Do Oil Co. was
neither a willful trespasser nor even a trespasser; therefore
it could not be treated worse than good faith trespassers,
who are allowed to deduct costs from proceeds in computing
damagesT4To phrase it as one Texas court did, "a cotenant
who produces minerals from common property without
having secured the consent of his cotenants is accountable to
them on the basis of the value of the minerals taken less the
necessary and reasonable cost of producing and marketing
the same."75
The developing co-owner, therefore, cannot keep all proceeds, and the duty to account to Lazy Lou arises out of law
and is not a partnership obligation. Both the accounting duty
and right to develop are "quasi-contract principles under
which an obligation may be implied in law to do justice and
prevent unjust enri~hment."'~
As a quasi-contractual obligation, the right to an accounting for the profits of production
is not a tort remedy for which punitive damages are available; even a failure to make bookkeeping entries necessary
for an accounting does not make failure to pay Lazy Lou a
c o n v e r s i ~ nAdditionally,
.~~
a co-owner must account to other

73

Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 573 (8th Cir. 1924).

74

Id. at 573-74; see also Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1965).

" K ~ u V.~ Krug, 618 P.2d 323, 325 Man. Ct. App. 1980). In one instance, the
Internal Revenue Service treated the proceeds of a suit for accounting as capital
gains, not royalty. This could indicate that the sums represented diminution of
value of the property, not ongoing income. Gail v. United States, 58 F.3d 580 (10th
Cir. 1995).
%itchell

Energy Corp. v. Samson Resources Co., 80 F.3d 976 (5th Cir. 1996).
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co-owners even if the developer did not mine more than its
proportionate share or exclude others from mining. This is
because one co-owner cannot unilaterally partition the property." Moreover, the right to an accounting is personal to the
cotenant and past accruages do not impliedly transfer with a
transfer of the cotenancy property absent an express assignment.'' There is, however, some support for royalty as the
measure of liability to the non-developer in some situations.'O
§ 20.05 Basic Contours of Accounting for Oil and Gas
Production
The process of accounting in the oil and gas venue is not
dramatically different than the problems Avery and Lou had
over their fishing cabin. The value of repairs and improvements may be questioned either in a n independent accounting or in an accounting appurtenant to a partition. For oil
and gas, the basic rule is t h a t net proceeds go to the nondeveloping co-owner only after a well pays out; the developer
may deduct costs of drilling, producing, and marketing."
More specifically, reasonable costs of production include costs
of drilling, equipping, and operating a well, repairs and
replacement of equipment, and taxes and overhead expenses.
The basic caveat is the expenses must be proper to product i ~ n . 'Moreover,
~
the non-developing co-owner is only due

I

i

I

"white v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967, 976 (Tex. 1948) (rock asphalt involved and
property differed in mineability).
%eiser-~rown Oil Co. v. Samson Resources Co., 966 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1992)
(no gas balancing agreement existed).
BO

McIntosh v. Ropp,
- - 82 A. 949 (Pa. 1912) (life tenant executed lease and
remainderman of V2 interest ratified it; development was not a trespass a s to the
other remainderman either before or after death of life tenant); Petroleum Explor.
Corp. v. Hensley, 284 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Ky. 1955) (royalty basis of award to nonleasing co-tenant when the lease provided for a flat royalty and there was no meter
on the gas well; damages based on value of production minus costs would be
speculative because product amount unknown). In Kentucky, a non-consenting coowner only gets a royalty until the co-owner notifies the developer of its interest;
from that date net profits are the measure of accounting. Gillispie v. Blanton, 282
S.W. 1061 (Ky. 1926).
" ~ e e k e r v. Denver Prod. & Ref. Co., 188 P.2d 854 (Okla. 1947).
82~etroleumExplor. Corp. v. Hensley, 284 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1955); Burnham v.

§ 20.05[1]
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a proportionate share of proceeds and the developing coowner may only recover costs out of proceeds. There is no
right to an independent action for contribution such a s Avery
had in the fishing cabin scenario. Oil and gas lien statutes,
however, depending on their breadth, may assist the developing cotenant in recovering the expenses.83
Although the majority position generally allows a developing co-owner to only account for net profits, if the developing
cotenant actually excluded the other cotenant, then it is
possible that the cotenant may not receive a credit for
expenses. If the wrongful exclusion was in good faith,
perhaps because of a valid title dispute, accounting for net
proceeds would still be appropriate.84 If, however, the
exclusion was in bad faith, the producing cotenant will not
be able to recover costs.85
[I] Proof of Proportionate Shares of Proceeds in an
Accounting
Both Dudley Do Oil Co. and Lazy Lou may run into
obstacles in determining the net proceeds due the nondeveloping co-owner. Because of the vagaries of litigation,
therefore, most instances requiring accounting arise from a n
inadvertent failure to join all interests rather than a purposeful plan to develop individually. Three major items often
are disputed: the amount of hydrocarbons produced, the

Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
83

John Carey Oil Co. v. W.C.P. Investments, 533 N.E.2d 851 (Ill. 1988) (operator
of cotenancy property without a lien right granted by agreement may use the
statutory lien process); accord Amarex v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 772 P.2d 905
(Okla. 1987); Kenmore Oil Co. v. Delacroix, 316 So. 2d 468, 469 (La. Ct. App. 1975);
Davis v. Sherman, 86 P.2d 490 (Kan. 1939) (in dicta, oil lien claimed only on a
fractional interest of a cotenant and not on the entire leasehold partially owned by
the lien claimant may be allowed). But see Gaudreau v. Smith, 21 P.2d 330 (Kan.
1933) (one cotenant cannot file lien on entire leasehold in which cotenant has
interest). See also Fife v. Thompson, 708 S.W.2d 611,611-12 (Ark. 1986) (equitable
lien rather than statutory lien allowed on one whose interest was 'tantamount to
co-tenancy" with lienor).
8 4 ~ e wDomain Oil & Gas Co. v. McKinney, 221 S.W. 245 (Ky. 1920).
85

Foster v. Weaver, 12 A. 313 (Pa. 1888); Erisman & Dalton, supra note 2. a t 7-14
& 7-15.

1 the developing coroceeds. There is no
bution such as Avery
nd gas lien statutes,
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proceeds from sale of the hydrocarbons or their value, and
the appropriateness of items of expense. This cautions
against voluntarily developing without concurrence of all or
most owners.
From the viewpoint of the developer, the best stratagem is
to have testimony on expenses indicating that they were
such as would be incurred by a n ordinarily prudent operator." It is important to remember that the right to an
accounting for a share of reasonable expenses out of production arises out of cotenancy. Other agreements may not
modify the rights unless expressly so stated. For example, if
the non-developing cotenant had also signed an Authorization for Expenditure (AFE), the amount listed in the AFE
would only limit the non-developing co-owner's exposure if
the amount was exceeded and the well was a non-producer.
The AFE affects personal liability, but it does not limit a n
accounting from proceeds.87
In the realm of accounting proof, the non-developing coowner does operate a t a disadvantage because the developer
controls the bulk of the information. Discovery mechanisms
may not provide relief if Dudley Do Oil is not the best of
bookkeepers. Therefore, one court has given those like Lazy
Lou some leeway; in estimating production for revenue
accounting, the non-producing cotenant's expert can rely on
information from a commercial production service, which in
turn relies on information from the state, which came from
the operator.88
[2] Specific Items of Expense Considered
Court decisions on accounting issues have been sympathetic
to the developer's actual physical outlays, but have sometimes balked a t expenses that could not be proven to have
been needed or to have benefitted the non-developing co-
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= ~ s h l a n d Oil & Refining Co, v. Bond, 263 S.W.2d 74,76 (Ark. 1953).

1

"1d.

i
!
1. .
-,

"south Central Petroleum, Inc. v. Long Bros. Oil Co., 974 F.2d 1015, 1018-19
(8th Cir. 1992) (applying Arkansas law).

owner.BgAs an example of the first premise of generosity,
reasonable compensation for the developer's services and use
of its machinery and plant have been allowed.g0Expenditures for a pumping plant and pipeline also were approved.g1Additionally, courts have recognized that overhead
is a legitimate charge to the transaction. For example, the
cost of supervision, which included an ofice and personnel,
was credited because the developer needed to check on
contractors and this was the most economical and efficient
way to do the work.% Insurance is also an allowable
On the other hand, a clear example of a cost not
benefitting the non-leasing co-owner would be royalty paid to
the leasing cotenantSg4More controversial expenditures
require additional elucidation.
First, in assessing reasonableness, courts look to the
normality of expenses. Sometimes an unusual expense may
not be allowed, even if it was the only way to develop a t the
particular time. For example, in order to get equipment and
a driller during a period of tight availability, the developer
had to offer an oil payment to avoid black market prices for
the work. The court disallowed the oil payment as an
expense and only deducted "actual expenses" for drilling a t
normal rates.'=
Moreover, not every undertaking by even a reasonable and
prudent operator brings forward a clear benefit. One court

89~ohnsonv. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 135 P. 589 (Kan. 1913)(burden on operator
to prove deductible expense). See generally Annotation, "Basis of Computation of
Cotenant's Accountability for Minerals and Timber Removed from the Property," 5
A.L.R.2d 1368 (1945).

%bite v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967, 979 (Tex. 1948) (rock asphalt).
91

Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).

92~onnettev. Wright, 98 So. 674, 676 (La. 1923); New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v.
McKinney, 221 S.W. 245 (Ky.1920).
"~mither v. Betts, 264 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1954).
ga~rairieOil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 574 (8th Cir. 1924).
% ~ s s l e yv. Mershon, 262 P.2d 417 (Okla. 1953).
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rejected charging unsuccessful fracking to the non-consenting
co-owner from profits of other joint wells, using the premise
that the developer only gets reimbursed for expenses that
enhance the property.g6 By analogy to cases dealing with
conservation commission approved unit expenses, however,
it is possible that costs for wells that accidently deviated or
ended up being drilled illegally could be recovered from
proceeds from other producing wells.97
In a similar vein, because not every well drilled is a
producer, the ability to recoup costs of dry holes has been
controversial. Connette v. Wrightge involved cotenants in a
leasehold. The first well drilled was a producer. In fact, there
were multiple producers but some dry holes were also
drilled. The non-developing cotenant signed division orders.
The Louisiana court held the cotenant liable for the reasonable costs of drilling all wells:
The execution of the division orders and the receipt of his
share of the proceeds of all of the oil produced and sold
was a complete ratification by defendant of the drilling
operations conducted by plaintiff on the whole property.
The acquisition of the property jointly as a whole and the
drilling of wells by plaintiff on all of the leases, the
benefits of which were availed of by defendant, must be
considered a s a single enterprise, jointly engaged in by
the parties.99

))(burden on operator
!is of Computation of
from the Propertynn5
sphalt).
1912).
ain Oil & Gas CO.V.

%Knight v. Mitchell, 240 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). Trackingn seeks to
increase permeability and hence recovery by fracturing the formation.
"~ennaco Resources Corp. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 831 P.2d 656 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1992) (parties knew geological conditions were difficult and order contemplated
need to sidetrack); Wagner & Brown v. Ward Petroleum Corp., 876 F. Supp. 255
(W.D. Okla. 1994).
"98 So. 674 (La. 1923).
99

Id. a t 676; see also Moody v. Wagner, 23 P.2d 633 (Okla. 1933) and Martel v.
Hunt, 197 So. 402 (La. 1940). Cf. Davis Oil Co. v. Steamboat Petroleum Co., 570 So.
2d 495 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (dry hole costs billed to non-operator under commission
authority to consider reasonableness of drilling costs charged a non-operator).

Other courts have not viewed the dry hole costs as recompensable from other producing wells. In McMillan v. PoweZZ,'OOthe developer sought recompense from other jointly
owned properties, but because there was no agreement to
operate the leases as a group, the dry hole costs were not
all~wed.'~'
Whether or not interest could be charged to the nondeveloping cotenant on the sums expended by the developer
has been similarly debated, although courts have disallowed
~ ~ question of whether the proit. In Cox v. D a v i s ~ n , 'the
ducing cotenant could get interest on money put forward was
answered in the negative because the non-developing coowner has no personal obligation to pay any part of the cost
of development. The court found it immaterial whether the
developer actually borrowed money or not. It did, however,
recognize some business realities:
Ordinarily, money will make money and it is probable
that had the producing cotenants put their money to work
in some other business undertaking, they probably would
have realized some returns therefrom. Arguments may be
and have been marshalled to support the equitable claim
of the producer. It is he who takes the risk and, if successful, he usually produces financial gain for both himself
and his cotenants. However, there is something to be said
for the nonjoining cotenant. Actual production of minerals
is not the only way by which benefits may be obtained
from the ownership of mineral interests in land. Drilling
may and often does condemn property for mineral purposes.103
1M)

362 S.W.2d 721 (Ark. 1962).

lolld. See also Davis v. Sherman, 86 P.2d 490 (Kan. 1939) (no recovery when
producer was drilled before dry hole); Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Bond, 263 S.W.2d
74 (Ark. 1953); Katnig v. Johnson, 383 P.2d 195 (Okla. 1963); Burnham v. Hardy
Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); and Williamson v. Jones, 27 S.E. 411
(W. Va. 1897). See generally 2 Williams & Meyers, supra note 2, $ 504.3.
'397

S.W.2d 200, 201-02 (Tex. 1965).

lmld. a t 202. See also Essley v. Mershon, 262 P.2d 417 (Okla. 1953) (claim was
unliquidated before judgment so interest was not a recoverable item of production
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The court acknowledged the use value of money, but also
recognized that the non-developing cotenant might have
chosen to not develop in order to maintain the speculative
value of the property. The dissent in Cox1" argued that the
majority misconstrued the issue: "The basis for the settled
law that the passive cotenant must account to the active one
upon successful completion of a well, is that it restores to the
active cotenant the funds h e expended in the venture, the
costs he incurred for the benefit of all cot en ant^."'^^ In its
view, the recompense due is calculated by looking a t the
benefits of the overall venture. This approached the heart of
the issue: whether accounting should be based on a per well
or a per tract basis.
[3] Accounting Per Well or Per Tract?
Resolving the question of whether accounting should be per
well or per tract could solve some of the dilemmas over dry
holes and interest charges. Naturally, the developer only
recovers expenditures out of some proceeds, so there must be
some successful production. Allowing per tract accounting is
logical. It also promotes development.
A co-owner, or the lessee of a co-owner, bears 100% of the
risk of the first dry hole. If the first well is successful, the
developer will not reap 100% of the proceeds. If the outstanding interest is small, less that lo%, the feasibility of proceeding
may not alter significantly. Nevertheless, if the outstanding
interest is 50%, the prospect would have to improve before
drilling. If the developer, however, would be able to recoup the
cost of the dry hole out of later producing wells, the financial
picture could change.
Essentially, a per tract accounting would look a t all reasonable expenditures made to develop jointly owned property

I

I
and marketing expense); Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 268 P.2d 878 (Okla.
1953) (no interest on operating wst of a well largely on ground that there was no
evidence operator paid the same or that interest expense was necessary to obtain
production).
lW397 S.W.2d at 204.
lO51d.

and allow proportionate recovery of expenditures out of
successes. For some items, such as roads, this procedure has
the additional advantage of simplicity; a road could be
needed to drill or service several wells and apportionment
among wells is difficult. The test for deductibility should be
whether a reasonable and prudent operator would have
incurred the costs in a good faith effort to recover oil and
gas.'06 Even dry holes provide the benefit of geological
knowledge.
0 20.06 Relationship of Lessees Leasing From Separate
Cotenants
If each co-owner leases to separate oil and gas companies,
the respective lessees will step into the shoes of their lessors
and become cotenants. In our hypothetical, Lazy Lou now
enters the fray and leases to the Lucky But Lazy Oil Company. This company and the Dudley Do Oil Company, however,
will not jointly own one lease, but each company will be a
lessee governed by the terms and conditions of the lease its
co-owner lessor granted. If the two companies enter into an
operating agreement, which is a contractual arrangement to
share the risks and costs of drilling, and Dudley Do drills a
well under that agreement, it would make the well the
activity of the Lucky But Lazy Oil Co. so as to preserve its
lease.'07 If there is no operating agreement, the scenario
differs.
In Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.,'OB one lessee
drilled a well before delay rental payments were due under
the lease of the non-developing lessee. The well was a

'066 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Edition 256 (David A. Thomas ed.,
1994). Alternatively, the question could be framed as whether it would unjustly
enrich the non-developing co-tenant to not share the costs. Hemingway, supra note
2, § 5.1(B). This question subtly differs from the prudent operator standard; a
search for unjust enrichment employs hindsight and the prudent operator standard
looks at the situation a t the time the development plan is undertaken.

107~illson
v. Superior Oil Co., 274 S.W.2d 947,951-52 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). For
a general discussion of an operating agreement, see 2 Williams & Meyers, supra
note 2, 8 503.2.
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producer and two questions arose: first, did the drilling of
the well forestall the need for rental payments and, second,
did the well extend the non-developing lessee's lease into the
secondary term. The court concluded that the act of one
lessee will satisfy the requirements of the lease of the other
only if a n agreement exists between the two le~sees.''~
Because the parties, however, had construed the delay rental
requirement as simply requiring the commencement of a well
on the land, the lease did not end during the primary
term."' Nevertheless, to enter the secondary term required
the lessee to produce."' Under Earp, the Lucky But Lazy
Oil Co.'s lease would have expired after the primary term
and Lou would be considered an unleased cotenant due an
accounting directly from the Dudley Do Oil Company.
The Earp scenario was revisited in a case from North
Dakota, Schank v. North American Royalties, Inc."' The
lessee of another cotenant had drilled a well before the
rental payment date of the second, subject lease. That lessee
did not participate in the drilling of the well. The court held
that the well would not meet the unless clause requirem e n t ~ . "As
~ the court stated: "Under the terms of these
contracts, the lessors have every right to look to the lessees
to carry out these terms by some affirmative action on the
part of the lessees, not by the refusal on the part of the
lessees to participate with the lessee of other fractional
interests who drills a well on the land."ll4 A lessee must

110
Id. But see Hughes v. Cantwell, 540 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)
(failure to include "by the lessee" after requirement to pay rentals unless drilling
was commenced within a year did not mean that lessee could rely on drilling by
lessee of a co-tenant).
"'27 P.2d at 865-66. Accord Mattison v. Trotti, 262 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1959)
(interpreting Texas law) (well was shut-in and non-developinglessee did not even
try to pay shut-in royalties).
112201 N.W.2d 419 (N.D.1972).

show more than passive acquiescence in the drilling of wells
by others. As in Earp, the court founded its rationale on the
avoidance of speculative holding. An Oklahoma court
similarly construed Earp:
The contract being executed for the purpose of procuring
development upon the premises by the lessee the clause
should be interpreted to mean that the lessee is required
to do the drilling and that the act of a third party independent of any co-operation on the part of the lessee is
not in compliance with the terms of the lease.ll5
Therefore, the lessee would only meet its lease's requirements by drilling itself or through contracting with another
to so drill.ll6 The Lucky But Lazy Oil Company lease
would not have survived.
Dudley Do Oil Company's situation obviously differs. The
developing co-owner's lessee indisputably meets the requirements of its lease. The lessee will begin to pay Avery, its
lessor, royalties immediately upon receipt of proceeds.
Presuming the lease of the second cotenant is still valid,"'
the developing lessee will then account to the lessee that is
not developing. How and when a non-developing lessee such
as the Lucky But Lazy Oil Co. must pay its lessor is less
clear. Royalties are due immediately but the non-developing
lessee, unless it has paid costs pursuant to a JOA, gets no
money until after the well pays out. Some jurisdictions allow
deferral of royalties with the lessee required to make-up past
due royalties; all proceeds will go to the lessor until back
royalties are paid.118

115

Buckles v. Wil-Mc Oil Corp., 585 P.2d 1360, 1362 (Okla. 19781, quoting Earp,
27 P.2d at 864.
116

Id. (lease can be extended by well drilled by a farmee). Some courts have
looked at whether or not a lease expressly says work must be done by the lessee.
See 2 Williams & Meyers, supra note 2, 503.1.
117

For example, in Schank the lessee could have paid delay rentals to preserve
its lease during the primary term.
118

Earp. 27 P.2d at 866. See also 1 Kuntz, supra note 2, at 153-55.
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9 20.07 Relationship of Lessees as Cotenants of One
Lease
Another scenario could have arisen from the Avery and Lou
co-ownership. They could have leased to two oil companies
under the same lease. This, however, is not a very common
occurren~e."~It is not uncommon, however, that partial
working interests are assigned in a n oil and gas lease. Therefore, this situation must be addressed. To a certain extent,
the working interest owners are now cotenants and some of
the general law of cotenancy applies. The wording of a
particular lease, assignment, or joint operating agreement,
however, may provide for differing results.
With this caveat firmly in mind, each co-owner of the lease
generally can operate i t pursuant to the majority rule of
cotenancy development. For example, in Celsius Energy Co.
v. Mid America Petroleum Co.,120 a lease gave the lessee
the right "to unitize the leased premises or any portion or
portions thereof, . . . with any other lands." An assignee of
37.5%of the leasehold estate pooled its interest. Production
occurred off the leased tract. The lessors claimed the pooling
was unauthorized and the leases terminated. The Tenth
Circuit held that partial interests may voluntarily pool
unless language to the negative exists in the lease, which
was not the case here.'''
Another aspect of a co-owner's rights was emphasized in
Bellet v. Grynberg.'22 First, the New Mexico court recognized that working interest owners without a n operating
agreement were cotenants. As a result, it held the producing
l l g ~ v e r yand Lou could, however, have decided to act in concert and lease to one
company. In such an instance of joint negotiation, one cotenant could not attempt
to gain a secret or additional benefit from the oil company. All benefits would have
to be shared despite the fact that the cotenants are not fiduciaries. Howell v. Bach,
580 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
'"894

F.2d 1238, 1239 (10th Cir. 1990).

121

rentals to preserve

Id. (good faith and a geological basis for pooling were conceded). But see Edwin
M. Jones Oil Co. v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co., 794 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App. 1990)
(cannot pool lessor's working interest in lease).

33-55.

'"845

P.2d 784 (N.M.1992).

cotenant could be reimbursed for speculative expenditures
only out of production. As to other necessary and reasonable
expenditures, the producing cotenant could receive an
equitable lien on the other party's interest. The court went
so far a s foreseeing the possibility of a personal judgment
against the non-operating working interests for these
necessary ~ 0 s t s . lThis,
~ ~ of course, goes beyond normal
cotenancy rules for recovery.
§ 20.08 Basic Contours of Partition: A Right or a
Hardship?
One way to end the difficulties cotenancy presents for
development disagreements is to seek ~ a r t i t i 0 n . lThere
~~
are two types of partition: voluntary and i n v o l ~ n t a r y . ' ~ ~
Voluntary partition is consummated by the parties deeding
to each other. Involuntary is a creature of courts and
statutes.
In voluntary partitions, parties often are more concerned
about partitioning the surface than the minerals, which can
create title problems. For example, in Barfield v. Holland,'* voluntary deeds between co-owners of a large tract
made the surface of Tracts A, B, and C owned individually,
but the mineral interests remained in undivided ownership.
Therefore, the surface and mineral estates were severed.
When a grantee accepted a deed from each individual
naming individual tracts, he only received the ownership of
each individual in the particular tract conveyed, namely the
respective surfaces and an undivided 1/3 interest in the

124Another way is to seek a receivership or trustee, discussed in 1 Kuntz, supm
note 2.1 5.7; Outerbridge, supra note 2, a t 20-46 - 20-56, and Smith, supra note 47,
a t 142-50.
'''see Annotation, "Partition ofundivided Interest in Minerals (Including Oil and
Gas) in Place," 173 A.L.R. 854 and Annotation, "Right to Partition in Kind of
Mineral or Oil and Gas Land," 143A.L.R. 1092.
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844 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.App. 1992).
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minerals in each tract. The grantee remained a cotenant
with the remaining mineral owners.12'
Other items to note about voluntary partitions include that
they may be rescinded for mutual mistake, but not if only one
party was mistaken, unless the mistake was known to the
other party or induced by that party.128 Additionally, the
concept of voluntary partition does not allow one co-tenant to
convey a specific part of the property to a third party without
the concurrence of the other co-owners.129The other cotenants could, however, ratify the conveyance if desired. Upon
judicial partition in kind, so called "equitable partition" may
come in to protect the purchaser by having the specified land
set over to the conveying cotenant.13'
Involuntary partition may be obtained by one co-owner
through petition to the court. General rules applying to
partition apply to partitions of mineral interests.13'
111 Majority Views Partition as a Right
The owner of a concurrent interest in property may not
desire it to be partitioned. The co-owner may fear being
bought out a t a low price or the loss of future speculative
earnings. Tax consequences may also influence a desire not
to change the status quo.132Nevertheless, in most jurisdictions, one co-owner's desire for a partition is a right and no
~ ~ objecting cotenant cannot
defenses are a ~ a i 1 a b l e . lThe
defeat partition merely by showing a partition would be
"inconvenient, injurious, or even ruinous to a party in

27~d.
12'2apetero v. Canales, 730 S.W.2d 111(Tex. App. 1987).
12'see Adams v. Yukon Gold Co., 251 F. 226 (9th Cir. 1918).
in 1 Kuntz, supra
~ i t hsupra
,
note 47,
(Including Oil and
rtition in Kind of

130see 2 Williams & Meyers, supra note 2, 5 507.
131see Hemingway, supra note 2, 5 3.3; 1 Kuntz, supra note 2, $5 6.1-6.6; 3
Summers, supra note 2, $5 535-538, and 2 Williams & Meyers, supra note 2,55 506507.
'"~ee Moseley v. Hearrell, 171 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. 1943).
13'1d. a t 339 (equity cannot defeat right to partition).

interest."'" In order to avoid manifest hardship caused by
trying to divide the indivisible, courts may partition the
property by sale.135
[21 Minority Allows Defenses to Partition
Other jurisdictions allow partition sometimes to be defeated
on equitable grounds. Oklahoma is one such state. As it has
explained, there should be no partition if partition would do
any one of four things, namely: (1)defeat the purposes of the
property's acquisition, (2) become an instrument of fraud, (3)
violate testamentary prohibitions on partition which are
upheld for a reasonable time, or (4) create inequitable
hardship and o p p r e ~ s i o n . 'Oklahoma's
~~
solicitude is also
revealed in a statute that requires a mineral interest owner
show that co-owners are frustrating the petitioning cotenant's development objectives.13' Nevertheless, the burden
is on the defendant to show the defense of oppression in
opposition to partition action.13' In one instance, relief was
denied because it was not fraud or oppression simply because
the party objecting to the partition had paid adequate consideration for the interest and the party seeking partition had
created the interest. The court also found no encroaching
development or rapid increase in value or inability of parties
to purchase a t sale.13' One state in addition to Oklahoma
that allows some defenses for fraud or oppression is Kansas.140

134~chnittv. McKellar, 427 S.W.2d 202 (Ark. 1968).
135
Id. at 209.
''Rodkey

v. Rees, 527 P.2d 1150 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).

13'0kla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1501 (1993). The party seeking partition must also
show that a compulsory pooling order would not remedy the difficulty.
l S ~ e n s o nv. Bryant, 330 P.2d 591, 593 (Okla. 1958).
lag1d.

14'see Strait v. Fuller, 334 P.2d 385, 390 (Kan. 1959) (may allege fraud or
oppression in defense: partition of oil and gas leasehold estates sensitive). Arkansas
and Mississippi may also take this view. Schnitt v. McKellar, 427 S.W.2d 202 (Ark.
1968) (alluding to the failure to allege fraud or oppression but possibly referring to
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[3] Partition in Kind Favored for Minerals
The general preference is to partition minerals in kind, that
is, to award minerals in separate acreage.14' The basic
rationale is that with unknown and highly speculative
mineral values, a present sale may yield little.'" Therefore, it is said that partition in kind of oil and gas rights is
proper where there has been no development on or near the
property and there is no reason to believe that any part of
the property is more or less valuable than any other
part.'43 If there is known oil and gas value for the property, however, partition in kind would not be appropriate;
partition by sale would be proper.144Similarly, if there was
no way to determine relative values of known mineral lands
without prohibitive cost, partition should be by sale.'45 An
accounting will often accompany the partition. A producing
cotenant will have to make a final accounting for net
proceeds. This acknowledges that the hydrocarbon produced
by one cotenant is rightly owned by that ~ 0 t e n a n t . l ~ ~
Occasionally courts get the opportunity to be creative. For
example, where surface and minerals were separately owned
and the property had no proven oil value, and partition in
kind was impossible because of the diversity of character or
estates or interests owned, and because some interests were

need to allege same to determine type of partition); Stern v. Great Southern Land
Co., 114 So. 739 (Miss. 1927).

lQ~hillipsv. Phillips, 104 N.W.2d 52, 56 (Neb. 1960).

:king partition must also
;he diEculty.

143~oxv. Lasley, 639 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Okla. 1981) (fact that holder of fractional
interest in minerals under land also held working interest under oil and gas lease
to some lands did not destroy right to obtain partition of mineral interest); but see
Colonial Royalties Co. v. Hinds, 216 P.2d 958 (Okla. 1948) (can partition by sale
even if no development imminent if too difficult to partition in kind).
144~ortney
v. Tope, 247 N.W. 751,753 (Mich. 1933).

(may allege fraud or
tes sensitive). Arkansas
r, 427 S.W.2d 202 (Ark.
ut possibly referring to
)

'%bite v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967, 973 (Tex. 1948).
146~eeKuntz, supra note 2, Q 13.03[2] (notes in discussing White v . Smyth that
the court did not subtract the value of the removed asphalt from the producing
cotenant's share of proceeds of a partition by sale).

only speculative possibilities, the trial court properly ordered
a sale of surface and minerals separately and distribution of
proceeds ratably.14' More intriguingly, when considering
the alternative of partition in kind, there is some precedent
for the idea of "checkerboarding." To avoid the possibility of
one cotenant being luckier in the division, a court has
suggested not giving each party only one division or allotment, because many allotments may be the most equitable
solution given oil's peculiar characteristic^.'^^
P 20.09 W h o Can Seek Partition
Generally, any co-owner not holding by tenancy by the
entirety may begin the partition process. Nevertheless, there
are five requirements for p a r t i t i ~ n . " ~One is that no statute either forbids the action or has not been complied
with.150 For example, normally a partition action would be
ineffective if all interest owners are not joined.l5l The
second requirement is that there must be no valid agreement
to not partition in place among the co-owners. These two
requirements are relatively straight-forward.
The last three requirements are more theoretical. First, in
order to seek partition, the petitioner must have a possessory
estate. Next, the person seeking partition must own interests
throughout the area to be partitioned. Finally, the estates to
be partitioned must be of equal dignity. Equal dignity refers
to the type or kind of estate, such as a mineral lease as

147~oker
v. Vierson, 41 P.2d 95 (Okla. 1935).
14'~endersonv. Chesley, 292 S.W.156,156 (Tex. 1927).The remedy was adopted
in Phillips v. Phillips, 104 N.W.2d 52 (Neb. 1960). I t is a more feasible solution with
a large tract and small number of co-owners than with a smaller tract and more coowners because of spacing requirements for drilling that exist in most states.
149~emingway,supra note 2, 5 3.3.(B) lists four: joint ownership, possessory
interest, equal dignity, and ownership throughout the tract.
'''see Erisman & Dalton, supra note 2, a t 7-20 n.89 (listing partition statutes of
Western states).
151
Cf.Mustang Drilling, Inc. v. Cobb, 815 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App. 1991) (partition
of a community property estate, not of particular land involved, and therefore was
effective).
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opposed to a mineral interest. A lessee therefore cannot force
partition upon its lessor and the owner of the remaining
undivided mineral interest .Is2 A difference in quantity of
estate owned does not impact rights to a partition; the owner
of a VlOO interest may force partition on the remaining
owners.
[I] Surface Owners May Seek Partition
The co-owners of the complete fee, both mineral and
surface, may obviously seek partition. The co-owners may
seek to partition both estates or partition the surface without
disturbing the oil and gas interest other than requiring it to
be held jointly by the parties as tenants in ~ornrnon.''~The
surface owner may also obtain partition as of right despite
the presence of an oil and gas lease with wells being operated.'"
[2] Mineral Owners May Partition the Minerals
Severing minerals creates a separate estate. It may be
partitioned even if the parties to the partition have no coownership of the surface.lS5 Even Louisiana allows partition of a mineral servitude, which is Louisiana's analog of a
mineral estate.'56 More particularly, courts have allowed
partition of an oil and gas fee, which was classified as an
interest in real estate.15' Courts have differed on whether
the presence of a possessory leasehold will foreclose a
cotenant in the oil and gas estate from seeking partition.'"

l a ~ e d i n a Oil Dev. Co. v. Murphy, 233 S.W. 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). See also
Kolb v. Morgan, 854 S.W.2d 719 (Ark. 1993) (when minerals and surface interests
are held in different ratios, neither a voluntary nor involuntary partition of the
surface will be a partition of the minerals) and Hemingway, supra note 2, 5 3.3.(B).
153
Wilson v. Hartman, 545 P.2d 742 (Okla. 1976).

menhip, possessory
l Y 1 ~ r w i v.
n Hines, 121 P.2d 612 (Okla. 1942).
partition statutes of
.PP. 1991) (partition
, and therefore was

lsschnitt v. McKellar, 427 S.W.2d 202 (Ark. 1968).
1 5 6 ~ aRev.
.
Stat § 31:172 (1996); see Campbell v. Pasternack Holding Co., 625 So.
2d 477 (La. 1993).
157
Holland v. Shaffer, 178 P.2d 235, 241 (Kan. 1947).
l W 3 Summers, supra note 2, § 537. If the lease is possessory, then the mineral

In Hoffman v. Sohio Petroleum Co.,15' in a jurisdiction
where a lease was not possessory, mineral owners who
executed a lease prior to partition could have the minerals
partitioned, but would only be entitled to oil and gas under
the land the partition set over to them unless the lease
contained an entirety clause.
Additional caveats are raised about partitioning severed
mineral interests because some courts have been protective
of surface owners; if they owned the surface and a n undivided interest in the minerals, it was thought that protection of
the surface might have been one rationale for retaining a
partial mineral interest. Nevertheless, the minerals can be
partitioned when one of the mineral cotenants owns the
surface, but maybe only a t the petition of the surface owner.
Earlier cases allowed concerns for surface protection to deny
partition when sought by one who only owned undivided
interests in minerals.l6'
[3] Oil and Gas Lessees M a y Partition Lease
Subject to the discussion infra in 3 20.10, oil and gas lease
working interests generally may be partitioned.l6l For
example, an operator could get partition when owners of
undivided interests in oil and gas leases refused to pay their
share of the expense of further development and operation
and marketability of the oil was impaired because of clouds

interest is not, therefore eliminating one of the prerequisites for partition, i.e., that
the interest be possessory. Similarly, most jurisdictions will not let a future interest
be partitioned; those that do, require the future interest to be vested, not
contingent.

Ia~erteling Bros., Inc. v. Bennett, 287 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Ky. 1956); Dawson
Daylight Coal Co. v. Beshear, 287 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1956) (owners of severed
minerals could not compel partition that included surface owner with unsevered
minerals); but see Brand v. Consolidated Coal Co., 76 N.E. 849, 850 (111. 1906) (no
partition without consent of all cotenants even at petition of surface owner). See
Annotation, "Right to Partition a's Affected by Severance of Estate in Minerals From
Estate in Surface by One or More Cotenants," 39 A.L.R. 741 (1925) and Smith,
supra note 47, at 142.
' " ~ e Mik v. Cargill, 485 P.2d 229 (Okla. 1971).
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on title.162Kansas, however, was a hold-out on whether an
oil and gas lease could be partitioned. After early cases
denied the right to partition an oil and gas lease classified as
personal property, the Kansas courts allowed partition
Part of the
without the need to make special a11egati0ns.l~~
controversy was whether or not the oil and gas lease was
possessory, a prerequisite for partition. Oklahoma, which
views a n oil and gas lease a s incorporeal and non-possessory,
did not fall into this conceptual trap. Furthermore, in some
jurisdictions that allow partition of the lease, lessors and
royalty owners are not necessary parties to an action for
partition of the lease by the 1 e ~ s e e s . l ~ ~
[4] Overriding Royalties and Non-Participating
Royalties Not Subject to Independent Partition
One of the primary prerequisites for partition makes it
impossible for royalty interests generally to be partitioned.
Only possessory interests are subject to partition. As the
Oklahoma court explained in De Mik v. C ~ r g i l l , ' an
~~
overriding royalty is not real estate and therefore not subject
to partition as of right. An overriding royalty only attaches
to produced oil or gas and its owner has no right to possess
the realty. Therefore, the royalty owner is not a tenant in
common with the owners of the mineral fee or of the leaseh01d.l~~

16'sweeney v. Bay State Oil & Gas Co., 133 P.2d 538 (Okla. 1943).
lastrait v. Fuller, 334 P.2d 385, 389 (Kan. 1959). Arkansas may still require
allegations offacts requiring equitable relief. Pasteur v. Niswanger, 290 S.W.2d 852
(Ark. 1956).
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Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982,
error refd n.r.e.). But see Celt Oil, Inc. v. Jackson, 469 So. 2d 261 (La. Ct. App.
1985) (lessors indispensable parties when their lessee seeks partition against their
cotenant).
16'485 P.2d 229 (Okla. 1971).
166~d.at 233-34. See also Muslow v. Gerber Energy Corp., 697 P.2d 1269, 1275
(Kan. 1985)(em~hasizingneedfor possessory interest to seek partition). Other cases
holding that royalties are not subject to partition include Douglas v. Butcher, 272
S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954, error refd n.r.e.). Therefore, partition would not
be useful to remove a dormant royalty from land that was rendering it unleasable.

Partition actions, however, may affect royalty interests. If
the royalty was appurtenant to all the lands to be partitioned, the royalty can remain attached to the original lands
and could burden a partition sale.167Conversely, partition
will affect a royalty interest granted on one co-owner's
interest, but that royalty will attach only to those lands
granted to the specific co-owner in severalty, with an
increase in size to compensate for the lesser areal extent.ls8
Q 20.10 Enforceability and Identification of
Agreements Not to Partition
Because partition is deemed a right, agreements not to
partition are only enforceable if they are reasonable in
time.16' With mineral co-owners, especially among those
who share working interests in leases, whether or not an
agreement not to partition could be implied from a management arrangement is a frequent and important question.
Courts do not view a simple covenant that one co-owner
would have exclusive management and control and the other
would contribute to expenses a s an agreement not to partition."' But the existence of a true operating agreement in
which "parties contract for the drilling of wells and such
drilling is either made the consideration for the transfer of
a mineral estate or is necessary to extend or perpetuate a

Smith, supra note 47, at 141-42.
16'~elgam Oil Co., Inc. v. Wirt Franklin Petrol. Corp., 209 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948).
la2 Williams & Meyers, supra note 2, Q 506.5. See also Annotation, "Right to
Partition of Overriding Royalty Interest in Oil and Gas Leasehold," 58 A.L.R.3d
1052.
16'cf. Roberts v. Jones, 30 N.E.2d 392 (Mass. 1940) (preferential right to
purchase that would bind subsequent purchasers is an unreasonable restraint on
alienation and partition).
'%omarek v. Perrine, 382 P.2d 748, 751-52 (Okla. 1963) (remedy for such a
breach of management duties is damages; preferential right to purchase clause not
sufficient waiver). See also Home-Stake Production Co. v. Tri-State Pipe Co., 415
P.2d 377 (Kan. 1966) and Moseley v. Hearrell, 171 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1943)
(cotenancy and oral agreement for one cotenant to operate not mining partnership).
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lease, [then] it must be inferred that the parties to the
drilling agreement did not intend for the estate to be
partitioned."171 That is, there can be no partition until
after the contemplated work would be completed.172
Provisions of operating agreements other than drilling
requirements present additional questions. Thomas v.
Witte173involved the partitioning of one oil lease of a unitized
group of oil properties when they were all covered by an
operating agreement presently in force. The court noted that
the right to partition is subject to waiver and to estoppel and
similar equitable defenses.174The court found that partition
could not be had without the consent of all the parties if to do
so would violate the prior agreement. This operating agreement referred to "joint lands," the need for one operator, and
had a preferential right to purchase provision. It also stated
the agreement would not be a partnership, but the agreement
would run with the joint lands until terminated. The court
found an implied waiver of the right to partition.175Obviously, express waivers of the right to partition for the time
necessary and reasonable to perform the joint operations would
most likely be enforced and are more reliable than seeking an
implied waiver if one participant seeks partition.176
Courts have also found waivers of the right to partition in
situations other than in what resembles a common JOA. For
example, one cotenant may appropriate special management
rights. In one such case, a cotenant had an exclusive execu171
382 P.2d at 751. See also Long v. Hitselberger, 602 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1980) (could partition when drilling completed).
17'~arner v. Winn, 191 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) (additional covenant
to manage leases after obligatory wells drilled not a waiver of partition rights).
17%9 Cal. Rptr. 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
1741d. a t 415.
175
Id. a t 417. See also Sibley v. Hill, 331 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960)
(preferential right to purchase in joint operating agreement, provision indicating
desire to continue cotenancy and operational status during life of leases indicated
absolute right of partition contracted away).
17'such waivers appear in most JOAs. See Kuntz, supra note 2, 8 13.04[51[al.

tive right in the form of a power of attorney contained in a
deed; it was considered a power coupled with a n interest and
could not be revoked unilaterally by a partition a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~
I n another instance, a grantor reserved a n undivided 1/2
interest in minerals and the right to designate minerals
under half of the tract in the event of dispute. The provision
was held neither to violate the rule against ~ e r ~ e t u i t i nor
es
restrain rights of alienation or partition; it was simply a
contract on how to partition.178
§ 20.11 Nature of the Relationship Between Mineral

Cotenants
A fiduciary is one who has a "duty, created by his undertaking to act primarily for another's benefit in matters connected
with the ~ndertaking.""~Absent a confidential relationship
with its cotenants or lessors, one cotenant is not a fiduciary of
the other in the mineral arena.''" Nor is the relationship one
of principal and agent, whereby one cotenant could bind other
co-owners in dealings with third ~arties."'
The results of this status are several. One cotenant need not
disclose information to another cotenant about the property's
value.18' Further, one cotenant may purchase the interest of
the other and it will be considered a n arm's-length dea1.1a3

177

Odstrcil v. McGlaun, 230 S.W.2d 353, 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (lease issued
by executive in contravention of power w a s void to co-tenant's interest).
178

Robertson v. Speer, 185 So. 2d 730 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966)

I

1 79

Black's Law Dictionary 625 (6th ed. 1990).

I80

Zimmerman v. Texaco, Inc., 409 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See
generally 1 Kuntz, supra note 2, 8 5.5.
181

E a r p v. Mid-Continent Petrol. Corp., 27 P.2d 855, 859 (Okla. 1933); Tungsten
Products, Inc. v. Kimmel, 105 P.2d 822 (Wash. 1940).
182

Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Samson Resources Co., 8 0 F.3d 976 (5th Cir. 1996).
But see Pure Oil Co. v. Byrnes, 57 N.E.2d 356 (111. 1944) (cotenant with special
knowledge concerning value of concurrently owned property should reveal same to
cotenant before cotenant sells to a third party, from whom cotenant then purchases).

I$

1

%
'lei'
v. Shamburg, 27 A. 992 (Pa. 1893). See also Anderson v. T.C. Owen &
Son, Inc., 97 So. 2d 369 (Miss. 1957) (cotenant may purchase a t judicial sale if lien
is only on cotenant's interest).
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The acquisition of one cotenant's interest by another need not
be shared with the remaining cotenants.18" However, if one
cotenant redeems a t a tax sale or buys out an adverse, hostile
interest, the remaining cotenants would be able to share upon
contribution under the theory that the purchasing cotenant
benefitted the property as a wh01e.l'~
In one aspect, however, fiduciary language and rules apply to
the concurrent relationship. In majority jurisdictions, the
~
statute of limitations will not foreclose an a c c o ~ n t i n g . 'In
minority jurisdictions, however, where one co-owner technically
cannot produce individually, the statute of limitations would
impact the time for which the producing cotenant would have
to account.18'
Simple property or fiduciary law, however, may not answer
all questions about the relationship between mineral coowners. The management and development of admittedly coowned property raises issues distinct from ownership of it.lW
Contractual law may be important in addition to the basic
property law on accounting and partition.
§ 20.12 Joint Operation Agreements and Cotenancy
Joint operating agreements are executed in two settings and
the setting may dictate whether or not cotenancy rules will
govern the participants to them. The first setting is when

1950) (lease issued
interest).

l e 4 ~ usee
t Rex Oil Refining, Inc. v. Shirvan, 443 P.2d 82 (Okla. 1967) (cotenant
to share interest acquired in 80 acres adjoining and unitized with concurrently
owned property on the theory that it would be inequitable to allow one cotenant to
get a greatly increased share of 160-acre unit).

,. App. 1966). See
a. 1933); Tungsten

1 8 5 ~ y e r v.
s Parkins, 412 P.2d 136 (Okla. 1965). But see Wilcox Oil Co. v. Schott,
327 P.2d 471 (Okla. 1958)(non-producing mineral interests a r e not separately taxed
so undivided mineral interest owner may buy a t tax sale free of other cotenants);
Smith v. Anderson, 57 Cal. Rptr. 774 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (principle that tax
payment inures to benefit of all cotenants inapplicable if interests separately taxed).

76 (5th Cir. 1996).
nant with special
11d reveal same to
t then purchases).

l s ~ u d e y v. Pure Oil Co., 11 P.2d 102 (Okla. 1931);Andrettav. West, 415 S.W.2d
638 (Tex. 1967).

T.G. Owen &
ldicial sale if lien
I V.

1e7~ommersv. Bennett, 69 S.E. 690 (W. Va. 1910) (remedy is one of damages).
' 5 i d d l e v. Simmons, 589 So. 2d 89 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (par01 evidence of
management agreement would not violate statute requiring conveyances of
immovables to be in writing).

working interest owners in a specific well or leasehold execute
a JOA. The second use of a JOA is to govern operation of tracts
that various oil and gas companies own in severalty.
In the first situation, working interest owners in a well are
cotenants and each can market the product and be free of
conversion liability. The remedy for cotenants seeking share of
sales (outside of any statute) is an equitable accounting
between co-owners or court recognition of industry practice in
the form of balancing in kind.'" Naturally, the terms of the
JOA can contractually modify these cotenancy rights.1g0The
second usage of a JOA, which involves tracts owned in severalty, is more problematical.
The Oklahoma courts examined it in Tenneco Oil Co. v.
District Courtlgl and found that a voluntary unitization
agreement that led to the creation of a unit by the Corporation
Commission and its order of approval did not create a cotenancy between the several leaseholders. There was no cross
conveyance of interests by use of words such as "grant,
bargain, [or] convey."'92 The court found the JOA to be merely a plan to unitize their several tracts for the purpose of
getting the most recovery, preventing waste, and protecting

lesi%nderson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 782 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Okla. 1989). The
Anderson case also interprets Teel v. Public Service Co. of Okla., 767 P.2d 391
(Okla. 1985). According to Anderson's reading of Teel, conversion occurs when: (1)
co-owning working interest owners have an operating agreement saying one owner
can market, and (2) the purchaser is aware that one of the working interest owners
not a party to a division order has revoked the operator's right to market, and the
purchaser considers itself buying the non-consenting owner's gas but does not
account to them. 782 P.2d a t 1371-72. These cases have been criticized as not
distinguishing true cotenancy from cotenancy-like situations and therefore make
operating agreements too much like common law cotenancies. See Martin, supra
note 2, a t 13-16 to 13-19. See also Heiman v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 891 P.2d 1252,
1257-58 (Okla. 1995) (before statutory remedy, pre-depletion cash-balancing not
required for each well but could be equitably ordered even if JOA silent).
''see
Penn, supra note 2, 8 18.02[3] (JOAs typically provide procedures for nonconsent operations, marketing, and accounting procedures; the latter will be
included whether or not a gas balancing agreement is part of the JOA).
'"465

P.2d 468, 469-70 (Okla. 1970).

192~d.a t 470. But see Texas' cross conveyance theory in pooling, discussed in 5
Summers, supra note 2, 8 956 (might be applicable in other situations).

'UTE

20-48

or leasehold execute
'ern operation of tracts
in severalty.
owners in a well are
duct and be free of
ants seeking share of
quitable accounting
f industry practice in
Ily, the terms of the
!nancy rights.''" The
c t s owned in severalTenneco Oil Co. v.
luntary unitization
;by the Corporation
ot create a cotenanlere was no moss
s such as "grant,
le JOA to be mereror the purpose of
te, and protecting

correlative rights. Therefore, no partition was available because
there was no ~ o t e n a n c ~ . ' ' ~
In addition to the unavailability of partition in absence of a
cotenancy, signatories to a JOA also may have no cash
balancing or accounting rights.''" This is important if parties
to a JOA have not produced according to their respective
shares. Generally, there are three ways to bring the underproduced party into balance:lg5 (1) balancing in kind, which
normally refers to volume of hydrocarbon produced;'96 (2)
periodic cash balancing to catch up the underproduced during
the well's life;lg7 and (3) cash balancing on depletion of the
reservoir. If no cotenancy is created by a unit agreement, then
of the three methods, balancing in kind is the preferred
method of balancing rights.''' Balancing in kind means that
each party may produce gas, with the understanding that the
non-producing party's gas is "still in the ground" and the nondeveloper's remedy is to produce. With the preference for
balancing in kind, a simple inability to market will not suffice
to order cash balancing when not nearing depletion.'99 ThereIS31d. See also Martin, supra note 2, a t 13-12 to 13-13 (most JOAs actively reject
creation of a partnership or cotenancy in the leases but are contracts relating to
property rights and grant rights to take in kind).
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s and therefore make
es. See Martin, supra
Id Co., 891 P.2d 1252,
1"
cash-balancing not
' JOA silent).

lW~echnically,a co-owner also does not have cash balancing rights, but rather
has a right to a n accounting for profits. This distinction eliminates some cash
balancing problems when parties sell a t different prices. The co-owner is accounted
to simply on the basis of the overproduced party's receipts minus costs. Kuntz,
supra note 2, a t 13-24, 5 13.04[5][c].
'%one location of such a summary is Beren v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356,
1359 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976, a s corrected on limited grant of cert.).
lg6~rofessorKuntz has suggested that in times of price fluctuation, courts should
have the discretion to balance on value of the gas produced, not merely its volume.
Kuntz, supra note 2, a t 13-23, 5 13.04[5].
l g 7 ~ h i sresembles the right a co-owner has to file periodic accounting suits.
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' the JOA).

'ling, discussed in 5
tuations).

I g B ~ o h e nv.
y Wexpro Co., 974 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1992). See Martin, supra note
2, a t 13-29 to 13-33.
199
Pogo Producing Co. v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 898 F.2d 1064,1067 (5th Cir. 1990).
See also the discussion in Taylor v. Woodpecker Corp., 562 So. 2d 888 (La. 1990)
(statute authorizing unit operator to sell gas of unleased interest owners who have
not otherwise disposed of their gas and obligating the unit owner to pay the

1

fore, care should be taken in drawing J O h to meet the needs
of market vagaries.
Often, an express gas balancing agreement is added to a JOA
to deal with who has what rights to produce and how to
remedy a situation where one party produces more than the
other. A gas balancing agreement may be contrasted with
general cotenancy rules:
A gas balancing agreement deals with gas volumes, not
dollars, and prevents a demand for cash balancing on a
current basis as would be required under the rules of
cotenancy. However, while cash balancing may be demanded a t any time in the absence of a gas balancing
agreement, it is seldom done. When a market is obtained by
the underproduced party owning 25 percent of the working
interest, that party is entitled to 25 percent of the production on a current basis. However, there is no rule under the
laws of cotenancy which permits such party to get into
balance by requiring that the owners of the other 75 percent
reduce their current sales to accomplish the balancing.200
The gas balancing agreement generally addresses the problem
of how to balance takes and delineates when cash accounting
will be appropriate.201In short, the cotenant exchanges the
right to an immediate share of net proceeds for a right to call
upon the overproduced party to restrict production. Each
cotenant, however, still has the theoretical right to produce all
the hydrocarbons, subject to contractual obligations.
§ 20.13 Compulsory Units and Cotenancy
Forced pooling is important in examining concurrent ownership for two reasons. The first is that it could remedy some
problems about development if the statutes allow force pooling
of undivided interests in tracts, not merely pooling of tracts
owned in severalty. Most state statutes do allow such compul-

proceeds to them may be sole remedy).
2 M ~ e n nsupra
,
note 2, 8 18.03[3].
201

Seegenerally Kuntz, supm note 2; Martin, supra note 2; Penn, supra note 2;
and Smith, supra note 2.
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sory pooling.202If the co-owners can make use of these statutes, the relevant commission would apprise costs and avert
some of the risks of developing individually. To do so, however,
will modify the availability of partition as a remedy.203The
second question concerning compulsory pooling and cotenancy
is whether the pooling itself creates a cotenancy with all attendant common law rights. It generally does not.20" There is,
however, some analogy to cotenancy in how conservation agencies manage a compulsory unit.
Naturally, a conservation commission may unitize and review
the reasonableness of drilling costs charged a non-operator. In
a state where the statute does not specify how the operator
may collect, a court must proceed according to equity. Louisiana found that by analogy to cotenancy law, a non-operating
owner or lessee, who does not consent to operations within a
compulsory unit, has no liability for costs except out of that
party's share of proceeds.205
There are differences between common law cotenancy and
what a commission may do. E.g., some commissions can apply
a statutory or discretionary non-consent penalty to a nonparticipating interest owner in pooling orders. In Bennion v. ANR
Production Co.?O6 the Utah Supreme Court found such a

2 0 2 ~ eAnderson
e
& Cuda, supra note 2, a t 16-14 to 16-18; Outerbridge, supra note
2, a t 20-16, identified 22 state statutes as expressly covering separately owned
interests in all or part of the spacing unit: Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming (current as of 1979).
2 w ~ s c aE.
r Swan & Joseph E. Hallock, "The Comparisons, Contrasts, and Effects
of Compulsory Pooling Statutes," 28 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Znst. 911, 916-17 (1983)
("partition of drilling units into separate smaller tracts would defeat the whole
purpose of their establishment"). Although the co-owners of tracts within the unit
might still seek partition, the commission unit would remain.
2 W ~ c h u l tv.
e Apache Corp., 814 P.2d 469, 471 (Okla. 1991) (forced pooling alone
does not create a cotenancy). Accord Wakefield v. State, 306 P.2d 305 (Okla. 1957).
See Martin, supra note 2, a t 13-14 to 13-16.
2 0 5 ~ a v i sOil Co. v. Steamboat Petroleum Co., 583 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1991).

Penn, supra note 2;

*%19 P.2d 343 (Utah 1991) (175% non-consent penalty, which meant the nonconsenting party received no revenues until 175% of the drilling costs were

penalty constitutional. It merely adjusts costs and does not
"take" property; the nonparticipating owner still has its
mineral interest and a right to royalty. With normal cotenancy, the developing cotenant can only recover reasonable
costs out of proceeds.
Another difference between cotenancy and compulsory pooling
is that a non-consenting party may elect to convert to a royalty
interest and an unleased mineral owner is often treated partly
as a lessor and partly as a working interest owner. In Fife v.
Th0rn~son,2~~
a case arising in Arkansas, the lessee of the
owner of 718 of the minerals was found able to develop and
then was required to account. Interestingly, despite the case
not being subject to the Oil and Gas Commission rules because
the discovery was made before January 1,1937, the accounting
was nevertheless done according to its provisions: that is, costs
were only charged to 718 of the unleased interest (an undivided
1/8) and a 118 of Y 8 royalty was granted.208
A final problem in a compulsory unit is how to "balance"
production; cotenants would simply "account" in cash. In the
absence of a gas balancing agreement, courts seem to prefer
balancing in kind unless it would create waste, preclude an
owner from recovering the owner's just and equitable share, or
infringes on the correlative rights of another owner by limiting
the owner's liberty to enjoy rights or causes damages to
them.2* Obviously, careful drafting of gas balancing agreements may be a priority.210With a totally recalcitrant co-

recovered).
m708 S.W.2d 611 (Ark.1986).
2 0 8 ~ d Provisions
.
such as these have been criticized a s providing a "further
discouragement to development without all co-owners consent" because the nonconsenting owner gets greater benefits than a t common law. Smith, supra note 47,
a t 133.

2 0 9 ~ u nOil
t Co. v. Batchelor, 644 So. 2d 191 (La. 19941, overruling Hunt Oil Co.
v. Batchelor, 633 So. 2d 259 (La. Ct. App. 1993). See also Amoco Production Co. v.
Thompson, 566 So. 2d 138,146 (La. Ct. App. 1990), writ denied, 571 So. 2d 627 (La.
1990) (cash accounting because of a lack of market a s ordered by the Commission
was not arbitrary and capricious). See Martin, supm note 2, a t 13-33 to 13-41.
2'0~ee8 20.12, supra, and see generally Kuntz, s u p m note 2; Martin, supra note
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CO-OWNERSHIP

5 20.14

owner, however, the availability of commission cost supervision
and risk penalties may make a compulsory unit advisable for
the active participant that intends marketing.
0 20.14 Cotenancy Contrasted with Other Mineral
Revenue Sharing Devices
One unity is basic to both a joint tenancy and a tenancy in
common: each co-owner has a right to possess the total
property. Therefore, without a concurrent right of possession,
the cotenancy relationship does not arise.211 Life tenants
and those holding the remainder, therefore, are not cotenants
because their rights of possession are not concurrent.212
Those with no possessory rights generally cannot be cotenants. A right to share in the net profits of the land, such as
a royalty, does not create a cotenancy with the mineral owner.213Similarly, jointly holding overriding royalties will not
create for the holders all the attributes of a cotenancy.214
There is one exception to the general rule.
If a party has an interest with all the attributes of a mineral
estate except for the executive right being held exclusively by
another, the holder of the undivided interest in the minerals
will be a cotenant. In Bullard v. Br0adwell,2~~
the owner of a
non-executive ll3 undivided mineral interest was found to be a
cotenant and entitled to l/3 of value of mineral minus costs
when the executive developed directly, rather than leasing. The
non-executive was not limited to l/3 of the customary royal-

I

2; Penn, supra note 2; and Smith, supra note 2.
providing a "further
sent" because the non'. Smith, supra note 47,
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verruling Hunt Oil CO.
noco Production Co. V.
ed, 571 SO.2d 627 (La.
ed by the Commission
a t 13-33 to 13-41.
2; Martin, supra note

211~parksv. Robertson, 203 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947, error refd). See
generally Knight, supra note 2, a t 227-30. The purported cotenants must have the
right to possess the same thing. Stoud v. Guffey, 3 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.
1927), a f d on othergrounds, 16 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Corn. App. 1929) (holder ofvalid
oil lease is not cotenant with holder of valid gas lease).
212~linev. Henry, 239 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Ct. App. 1951, error refd n.r.e.1.
213~umbergv. Kumberg, 659 P.2d 823 (Kan. 1983).
2 1 4 ~ a c ~ o n av.
l dFollet, 180 S.W.2d 334,337 (Tex. 1944).
215588 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).

ty.216The holding underscores the purpose of a non-executive
mineral interest: it is to share the proceeds of a mineral estate
without having the problems of co-owner concurrence in
development.
O 20.15 Conclusion
Multiple ownership of minerals increases the difficulties of
development. Not only may co-owners be unable to agree on
development, but the possibility increases that they may be
unlocatable or subject to a disability that makes them incapable
of ~ontracting.~~'
The majority of jurisdictions alleviate the
problem by allowing each co-owner to individually develop.
Nevertheless, the vagaries of accounting make reliance on
common law remedies somewhat precarious if substantial
undivided interests are outstanding. Some statutory devices
such as compulsory pooling and receivership could assist, but
they have problems in and of themselves. Therefore, concurrent
ownership will continue to be a bane of mineral developers.
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Id. at 399.

217~eeSmith, supra

note 47,at 130.

